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“The best you can discover about the "true" meaning of "jihad" is that you were a fool to ask the 
question in the first place.” – Jonathan Raban, The New Yorker1 
_____________________________ 
 
 Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the debate over the “true” meaning of 
the Islamic concept of jihad has been contentiously argued in American society, media, 
and government. Although most Americans had probably never heard of, much less 
thought about the meaning of the Arabic term jihad before the September 11 attacks, the 
word – and its connection to militant Islamist terrorism – rapidly became the subject of 
intense controversy and discussion among not only scholars and academics, but ordinary 
Americans as well. What did jihad mean? Was it the Islamic equivalent of “holy war”? 
Or was it simply an “internal spiritual struggle”? Were modern-day terrorists 
manipulating an ancient religious idea for their own ends, or was militancy inherent in 
Islam? In an effort to address these difficult questions, diverse theories, explanations, and 
conclusions have arisen. 
 Those seeking to explain the meaning of jihad – especially in the media – have 
tended to fall into two diametrically opposed camps, both of which provide inaccurate 
portrayals of what jihad has historically meant. The first, advocated by many experts 
sympathetic to Islam and concerned about the rise of anti-Islamic sentiment in America 
and Europe after September 11, holds that jihad is not a militant concept but rather 
nothing more than an internal, spiritual struggle to control one’s own selfish passions and 
desires. Many media reports in the months after September 11 included this explanation. 
Dr. Zaki Badawi, principal of The Muslim College in west London, offered that “Jihad 
has become an abused term. It does not mean holy war. It means the struggle to do 
                                                 
1 Raban, Jonathan, “My Holy War; What Do a Vicar’s Son and a Suicide Bomber Have in Common?” The 
New Yorker, February 4, 2002, p. 28. 
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good…[like] doing your job properly or controlling your anger or appetite.”2 A front-
page article in the Christian Science Monitor in October 2001 announced that jihad 
meant an “‘internal struggle’ for a just cause,” which was being “co-opted by 
extremists.”3 Farish Noor, a Malaysian scholar, told the Straits Times of Singapore that 
“Jihad…referred originally to a personal existential struggle against one’s own moral 
failings, like pride, fear, anxiety, and prejudice.”4 In the U.S., similar sentiments were 
echoed by Sarah Eltantawi of the Muslim Public Affairs Council, who told Greta Van 
Susteren of Fox News that jihad “means an internal struggle…that’s the classical 
definition of jihad. I can refer you to several books that highlight the classical definition 
of jihad as being an internal struggle for self-good.”5 
 On the other side, many commentators have promoted the theory that militant 
jihad as articulated by Osama bin Laden is actually part of Islam, and thus that Islam is 
an inherently violent religion. “We are at war with Islam,” Sam Harris wrote in the 
Washington Times. “The only reason Muslim fundamentalism is a threat to us is because 
the fundamentals of Islam are a threat to us.”6 Lawrence Auster, a contributor to 
FrontPageMagazine.com, blasted the Middle East scholar Daniel Pipes for suggesting 
that the promotion of “moderate Islam” is the solution to today’s militancy in the Islamic 
world. In Auster’s view, “The problem is not ‘radical’ Islam but Islam itself.”7 Robert 
Spencer, a well-known and outspoken critic of Islam, wrote in the Politically Incorrect 
                                                 
2 Alan Philps, “How God’s Struggle Became a War,” The Daily Telegraph (London), September 22, 2001, 
p. 4. 
3 Robert Marquand, “The Tenets of Terror,” Christian Science Monitor, October 18, 2001, p. 1. 
4 Kwok Kian Woon, “Battle Lines; The Words of the War,” The Straits Times (Singapore), December 31, 
2001, p. 1, 4-5. 
5 On The Record With Greta Van Susteren, Fox News Channel, February 13, 2002. 
6 Sam Harris, “Mired in a religious war,” Washington Times, December 2, 2004, p. A19. 
7 Lawrence Auster, “The search for moderate Islam,” FrontPageMagazine.com, January 28, 2005. 
http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=5F4D7BB5-CA89-4C09-986B-67CF241C2098 
(accessed March 31, 2009). 
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Guide to Islam that “there is no mistaking the centrality of violent jihad in Islam.”8 
Rather than having been a purely spiritual idea co-opted by extremists, Spencer argued 
that “the unpleasant fact is that violent jihad warfare against unbelievers is not a heretical 
doctrine held by a tiny minority of extremists but a constant element of mainstream 
Islamic theology.”9 Andrew C. McCarthy, the former New York prosecutor who put 
Omar ‘Abd al-Rahman in prison for life for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombings, told National Review that “the forcible tendencies of fundamentalist Islam 
may be exacerbated or rationalized by poverty, resentment, lack of democracy, etc. But 
they are not caused by such pretexts. The violence is commanded by scripture.”10 Many 
newspaper columnists echoed the sentiments of Washington Times columnist Diana 
West, who wrote that “what we know as ‘terrorism’ is directly linked to the centrality of 
jihad (holy war)…in Islam,” and wondered about the possibility that “the violent and 
hateful ideology runs through Islam itself[.]”11 Strangely, these commentators’ 
conclusions align closely with the views of militant Islamists themselves. Terrorism 
expert Steven Emerson records that Abdullah Azzam, the mentor of both Omar ‘Abd al-
Rahman and Osama Bin Laden, once proclaimed, “The jihad, the fighting, is obligatory 
on you whenever you can perform it. The word jihad means fighting only, fighting with 
the sword.”12 
                                                 
8 Robert Spencer, Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam and the Crusades (Washington, D.C.: Regnery 
Publishing, 2005), 34. 
9 Spencer, 38. 
10Andrew C. McCarthy, interview by Kathryn Jean Lopez, National Review Online, April 15, 2008. 
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MjUwZjcwOWQ1NjUwNTBlYWJiYWFmMzdlNmYxYTQ1OGU=
&w=Mg== (accessed March 31, 2009). 
11 Diana West, “The war of words; CAIR scores D.C. victory,” Washington Times, August 26, 2005, p. 
A21. 
12 Steven Emerson, American Jihad – The Terrorists Living Among Us (New York: Free Press, 2002), 135. 
Quoted in Andrew C. McCarthy, Willful Blindness: Memoir of the Jihad. (New York: Encounter Books, 
2008), 73. 
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 Yet this controversy is not a new phenomenon. From its origins in the pages of 
the Qur‘an to its usage in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries by radical Islamists as 
justification for acts of violence, the term jihad has long been a subject of controversy 
and debate, both in the West and within the Muslim world. As Richard Bonney wisely 
observes, “[D]iscussion and clarification of the term [jihad] are not optional extras, but 
mandatory for any understanding of the relationship between the Muslim world and the 
West.”13 
Which side, then, is correct? The answer, although complex and nuanced, is 
“neither.” Jihad, contrary to the claims of well-meaning experts, has not historically 
meant simply a spiritual, internal struggle, but has in fact frequently been tied to military 
and political conflicts from its earliest uses. A closer analysis of the evolution of jihad 
shows that it has been adapted throughout history by political leaders to fit the political 
circumstances of the time. At the same time, although much of the debate today (and 
throughout Islamic history) over the “true” meaning of jihad revolves around its 
significance as a theological or religious doctrine, the militant jihad advocated by Bin 
Laden is not “inherent in Islam,” nor does it prove that Islam is a violent religion bent on 
military conquest. It is more accurate to understand jihad as an idea which, although 
originating in a religious context, has been consistently used primarily as a powerful 
political and ideological tool by leaders and activists in order to further their own – very 
worldly – ends.  
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Richard Bonney, Jihad: From Qur‘an to Bin Laden (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 9. 
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PART I: Jihad’s origins in sacred Islamic texts 
The word jihad comes from the Arabic trilateral root jiim – ha – daal ) ج– ه –د ( , 
which in its verbal form jahada means literally “to strive” or “to struggle.” From its 
various contexts in the Qur‘an, one can see that jihad does not refer simply to warfare, 
but rather more specifically to “disputation and efforts made for the sake of God [fi sabil 
Allah] and in his cause.”14 However, even combined with references to jihad in the sunna 
(tradition) of the Prophet Muhammad, these verses do not constitute a coherent or 
practicable theological doctrine. 
Rather, the evolution of jihad as an important Islamic doctrine is long and 
complex – in fact, it has been the subject of controversy and debate within the Islamic 
world for most of Islamic history. The concept of jihad is founded in the usage of the 
term in the text of the Qur‘an itself. Out of 41 instances of jihad or its derivatives in the 
Qur‘an, ten specifically refer to the conduct of war.15 The rest are either clearly pacifistic 
in intent or open to either interpretation. In addition, there are other Arabic words that 
may be synonyms for armed  jihad, such as qital, or “fighting,” (Q.2:290-1, Q.9:30, 
Q.48:22, Q.60:9, Q.3:13, Q.4:74-6), ribat (Q.8:60), and harb (Q.2:279, Q.9:107, Q.5:33), 
which is the Arabic word literally meaning “war,” although this term differs from jihad in 
that it encompasses all warfare, whether legitimate (authentic and divinely sanctioned) or 
illegitimate (undertaken for personal or political gain). 
Richard Bonney believes that the development of the doctrine of jihad as found in 
the Qur‘an can be broken down into four distinct phases. In the first phase, Muslims were 
instructed to propagate the message of Islam peacefully, avoiding direct confrontation 
                                                 
14 Michael Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 21. 
15 Bonner, 22. 
Mayer 8 
with the unbelievers, or in the words of Asma Afsaruddin, “The Muslims were not given 
permission by the Qur‘an to physically retaliate against their persecutors.”16 In the second 
stage, the believers (mu’minun) were to confront the unbelievers by means of 
argumentation only, as long as it was done “in good spirit, meaningfully and 
effectively.”17  
The third phase was the point when Allah gave permission to the Prophet 
Muhammad and his followers to physically fight their enemies within the divine 
command. The mu’minun were “enjoined to wage war against those who initiated 
aggression against Muslims,” and were only allowed to do so after the end of the 
“sacred/forbidden months,” during which fighting was proscribed. However, three 
important verses in sura 42 describe the non-militant aspects of “enjoining right and 
forbidding wrong.”18 Although these verses give permission for self-defense in response 
to aggression, they also call on Muslims to be “patient in adversity and [forgive], this is 
indeed the best resolution of affairs.”19  
In the fourth and final phase, the Prophet and his followers were commanded to 
wage war against the unbelievers until they either submitted to Islam or agreed to live 
under Muslim rule and pay the jizya, or poll tax.20 These verses permit Muslims to fight 
those who have waged war against them, even during the “forbidden months,” since 
“discord and strife (fitna) are worse than killing.”21 The infamous “sword verses” (ayat 
al-sayf) go even further, instructing Muslims to “slay the polytheists wherever you find 
                                                 
16 Asma Afsaruddin, The First Muslims: History and Memory (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2008), 110. 
17 Afsaruddin, 110. 
18 Q. 42:40-43. 
19 Afsaruddin, 110. 
20 Bonney, 25-26. 
21 2:217. 
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them, and take them captive, and besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every 
conceivable place.”22 In addition, verse 9:29 instructs Muslims to: 
Fight against those who – despite having been given the revelation before – do not believe in God 
nor in the Last Day, and do not consider forbidden that which God and His messenger have 
forbidden, and do not follow the religion of the truth, until they pay the jizya with willing hand, 
having been subdued.23 
 
On its face, this Qur‘anic injunction seems completely contradictory to earlier 
commandments for Muslims to only fight in self-defense against an aggressor, and to 
show “patience” and “forgiveness” to those who wrong them. Indeed, another passage 
often referenced in conjunction with the “sword verses” is 2:191-193: 
Slay them wherever you catch them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out; for 
persecution is worse than slaughter. Do not fight them at the Sacred Mosque unless they fight you 
there. If they do fight you, kill them—this is what such disbelievers deserve—but if they cease, 
God is most forgiving and merciful. Fight them until there is no discord (fitna), and worship is 
devoted [only] to God. If they cease hostilities, there can be no [further] hostility, except towards 
aggressors.24 
 
How then is one to understand these Qur‘anic conceptions of jihad when they seem so 
incompatible and contradictory to one another? Is there a “correct” directive that should 
guide Muslims today? To answer this question (as well as explain other apparent 
inconsistencies found in the Qur‘an), Islamic scholars have generally followed one of two 
schools of thought. The first invokes the doctrine of naskh, or “abrogation.” This 
hermeneutic was enunciated by several early Islamic jurists during critical periods of 
warfare and armed conflict for the early Muslim community, and holds that the later 
verses revealed to the Prophet Muhammad abrogate, or supersede, any earlier verses on 
the same subject.25  
                                                 
22 9:5. 
23 9:29. 
24 2:191-193. 
25 Bonney, 24. 
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In the Qur‘an, the doctrine of abrogation becomes somewhat problematic because 
the suras, or chapters, are not arranged chronologically, but rather by length. Many 
Islamic jurists rely upon a generally agreed-upon chronology of when each sura was 
revealed to Muhammad. Broadly, Qur‘anic suras can be generally divided into two 
groups – the earlier chapters revealed to the Prophet during the thirteen years he spent in 
Mecca, and the later chapters revealed to him during his ten years in Medina. 
The theory of abrogation holds that since the two so-called “verses of the sword” 
(Q.9:36, Q.9:5) are part of sura At-Tawba – which was one of the last chapters of the 
Qur‘an to be revealed (in fact it was most likely twenty-seventh out of twenty-eight 
“Medinan” chapters, and the second-to-last revealed sura of the Qur‘an) – the directive to 
wage war unconditionally against the unbelievers “until they submit [to Islam] or pay the 
jizya [poll tax]” is an eternal and immutable divine command for the rest of time, and that 
these two verses nullify all earlier Qur‘anic verses – according to jurists, between 113 
and 140 ayat – that refer to a more peaceful conception of jihad.26   
Critics of the doctrine of naskh object for several reasons. First, they argue that 
allowing later verses to abrogate earlier verses prevents a holistic reading of the Qur‘an 
and thereby effectively inhibits a complete understanding of the revealed text. Instead, 
proponents of this theory – based the pioneering work of 11th century Islamic scholar ‘Ali 
ibn Ahmad al-Wahidi – argue that when examining Qur‘anic verses, one must take into 
account the asbab al-nuzul, the “circumstances of revelation.”27 Afsaruddin notes that 
many Muslim and non-Muslim scholars tend to “downplay the critical Meccan phase in 
the development of the Qur‘anic doctrine of jihad,” but it is “practically impossible to 
                                                 
26 Bonney, 25. 
27 Rippin, A. “The Exegetical Genre ‘asbāb al-nuzūl’: A Bibliographical and Terminological Survey.” 
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 48, no. 1 (1985): 1-15. 
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contextualize the Qur‘anic discourse on the various meanings of jihad without taking the 
Meccan phase into consideration.”28 
It is only possible to understand the development of a more aggressively militant 
call to jihad in the later Medinan chapters by realizing that it was introduced as a “last 
resort option…when attempts at negotiations and peaceful proselytization among the 
Meccans had failed…”29 Its development – and that of naskh – was in fact distinctly 
political in nature. 
 
Jihad in the early years of Islam 
As has been observed by Michael Bonner, the instances of jihad in the Qur‘an do 
not by themselves constitute a coherent doctrine. A recognizable and complete theory of 
jihad did not fully develop until another two centuries of Islamic legal reasoning, 
jurisprudence and scholarship had passed. 
The usage of the doctrine of naskh to legitimize aggressive, armed jihad can be 
understood when viewing its development within the context of the political 
circumstances that existed in the Muslim world during the first few centuries of Islam. 
Islam was a fledgling faith, surrounded by hostile empires and weakened by infighting 
following the death of the Prophet Muhammad. The early leaders of the Islamic 
community needed a way to both unify the believers under a single political entity, as 
well as direct their energies outwards by legitimizing armed conquest against the empires 
and nations that controlled Mesopotamia, Anatolia, Persia, and North Africa. 
                                                 
28 Afsaruddin, 111. 
29 Afsaruddin, 112. 
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 In the early years of Islam, many scholars devoted themselves to collecting and 
documenting the oral and transmitted reports about the life of Muhammad and his 
companions. The first to produce a complete compilation was Ibn Ishaq (d. 767), whose 
book al-Sira (“The Way”) was edited and reproduced by a later scholar, Ibn Hisham (d. 
834). The original title of Ibn Ishaq’s work, however, was Kitab al-maghazi (the book of 
campaigns/battles). Another scholar, al-Waqidi (d. 823) wrote a book by the same name 
which was “devoted entirely to the campaigns and raids of Muhammad’s lifetime.”30  
 These works represented a literary genre in Islam known as sira and maghazi, 
which described in detail the life of Muhammad and the history of the early Muslim 
community. They also contain an outline of the development of how that community 
came to view warfare and jihad – from the nonviolence of the early years in Mecca to the 
military conquests Muhammad organized from Medina. Ibn Ishaq’s work also contains a 
description of the Constitution of Medina (‘ahd al-umma, or “agreement of the 
community”). According to Bonner, “the community here is clearly founded more for 
war than for any other recognizable purpose, even though the text of the Covenant does 
not name the adversary in this war.”31 The sira and maghazi narratives document the 
many famous battles of the Prophet’s lifetime, from the Battle of Badr, to the Battle of 
Uhud, to the truce with the Meccans at al-Hudaybiya. Following his victory over the 
Quraysh, Muhammad turned his attention northward, directing (and even personally 
leading) campaigns against the Byzantine frontier fortresses. He “may have been 
                                                 
30 Bonner, 37. 
31 Ibid., 40. 
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planning for a large-scale campaign against Byzantine Palestine and Syria” when he died 
in 632.32 
 One important aspect missing from these narratives is any discussion of contrast 
between true jihad and “mere” fighting for personal or political gain. There is also little 
mention of the internal “jihad” against one’s own base desires, what will later be known 
as the jihad al-akbar, or “the greater jihad.”33 
 This brings us to the discussion of jihad in the hadith reports. Here lies the origin 
of much of the intense disagreement and debate over the nature and doctrine of jihad that 
has plagued the Muslim community for centuries. Many of these reports, compiled over 
time and by various collectors, are directly contradictory to one another. Bonner explains 
that “in the hadith we will often find a particular doctrine enunciated in one tradition and 
then, in another tradition, contradicted outright or in part.” This phenomenon forces 
readers – including the scholars, exegetes, and judges of Islam – to “choose between 
conflicting traditions.”34 More often than not, these rulings were influenced by the 
political necessities of the time in which these scholars lived. 
 For instance, one central theme in the hadith is the universality of Islam, and the 
injunction for believers to spread the faith throughout the entire world – including the use 
of military force to expand the political borders of Islamic rule. One report cites the 
Prophet as saying, “I have been sent to the human race in its entirety…I have been 
commanded to fight the people [the unbelievers] until they testify: ‘There is no God by 
                                                 
32 Bonner, 40. 
33 Ibid., 45. 
34 Ibid., 46. 
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God, and Muhammad is the Messenger of God.’”35 In the early years of Islam, the 
universality of the faith was cited as support for the conduct of aggressive jihad in the 
Islamic conquests following the death of the Prophet Muhammad. 
 Other hadith reports concern themselves with defining “correct intention” of those 
who participate in jihad – a clear distinction is made between “mere” fighting and 
“authentic” jihad. The Prophet is asked, “Men may fight out of a desire for booty, or for 
fame and glory. Who is it that fights in the path of God?” The Prophet responds that 
“Whoever fights so that the Word of God may be highest is fighting in the path of 
God.”36 Therefore, when initiating or directing armed conquest (usually for political or 
strategic reasons), Islamic rulers made sure to emphasize the legitimacy of the conflict to 
the community by using the label of jihad as a tool to unite the public behind the ruler 
and the campaign. 
 
The early Islamic conquests 
Following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, the burgeoning Muslim 
community found itself with a swelling population and growing power in the Arab world. 
However, under first caliph, Abu Bakr, the Muslim community was faced with the 
attempted secession of many tribes who wanted to leave the Muslim umma following the 
death of the Prophet. To prevent this, Abu Bakr launched what is known as the Wars of 
Ridda (apostasy) to defeat these wayward tribes. These wars, however, were not caused 
by disputes over adherence to Islamic theology or faith, but rather a standard case of 
political rebellion.  
                                                 
35 Jan Arent Wensinck, Concordance et indices de la tradition musulmane (Leiden: Brill, 1992): 160. 
Quoted in Michael Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 49. 
36 Wensinck, 166. 
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Although some of the tribes did wish to return to their pre-Islamic faiths, most did 
not renounce Islam – they simply refused to continue paying the zakat, or obligatory 
alms-giving, to the fledgling central Islamic government in Medina, and announced that 
their participation in the alliance ended with the death of Muhammad.37 Abu Bakr, 
realizing the profound danger that could result from a splintering of the political 
community and the importance of unity in the crucial first years following the death of 
the Prophet Muhammad, launched the Ridda Wars for starkly political reasons – to 
consolidate the Medinan government’s political authority over the conglomeration of 
tribes that spanned the Arabian peninsula.  
To justify his actions, Abu Bakr – like so many after him – selected those certain 
hadith reports which legitimized his arguments for war against the rebellious tribes. He 
cited reports in which the Prophet had announced that the lives and property of all 
believers were protected, but with the important exception of illa bi-haqqiha (“except for 
what is due upon it”), a requirement under which the payment of zakat fell.38 On this 
basis, Abu Bakr successfully argued for war against the rebellious tribes. 
The rebellion was crushed by Abu Bakr’s armies by 634, and he had again unified 
and consolidated power in Medina. Just as this was occurring, however, groups of Arab 
Islamic tribesmen were finding success in raids against the weakened Byzantine and 
Sassanian empires to the north in Syria, Palestine, and Iraq. There is evidence that such 
fighting “began locally, as raiding expeditions met with unexpected success.”39 Realizing 
the political need to quickly consolidate these gains and exploit them to the advantage of 
the new Islamic state, Abu Bakr quickly unified the command of these groups and sent 
                                                 
37 Afsaruddin, 27. 
38 Afsaruddin, 28. 
39 Bonner, 58. 
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larger armies to reinforce their efforts, pushing further into Mesopotamia and towards the 
Mediterranean.  
There are three remarks on jihad attributed to Abu Bakr: first, he lauded the 
service of those who fought in the way of God, saying that “every step of the warrior of 
God merits him seven hundred pious deeds, raises him seven hundred grades and effaces 
for him seven hundred sins.” However, Abu Bakr also cautioned Muslim warriors to act 
in strict accordance with the values emphasized by the Prophet: “Do not embezzle, do not 
cheat, do not break trust, do not mutilate, do not kill a palm or burn it, do not cut down a 
fruit tree, do not slaughter a goat or cow or camel except for food…”40  
The second caliph, ‘Umar, continued these conquests, pushing into Iran in the east 
following the Islamic victory over the Sassanian army at the Battle of al-Qadisiyya, and 
into Syria with the defeat of the Byzantine army at the Battle of Yarmuk. Jerusalem 
surrendered to ‘Umar shortly afterwards, and Islamic armies pushed into Egypt and North 
Africa. The Byzantine Empire, although weakened, still remained – a fact that would 
shape the development of the doctrine of jihad in the future. The fourth caliph, ‘Ali, gave 
a famous sermon on jihad, in which he emphasized the duty of every Muslim to fight in 
the way of God, saying that “even if you run away from the sword of today you [will] not 
remain safe from the sword of the next world…Paradise lies under the edge of spears.”41 
 The organization of the Muslim armies at this point was still very much tribal – 
forces were organized in tribal units, with each tribe dominating in the conquest of 
different area.42 In fact, a great point of debate among scholars of this period of Islamic 
history was whether or not these dramatic conquests were “Arab” or “Islamic.” From the 
                                                 
40 Bonney, 60. 
41 Ibid., 66. 
42 Bonner, 59. 
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Islamic point of view, medieval Arabic authors were unanimous in their belief that the 
early Muslims engaged in conquest because “God has commanded them to do so, and has 
given them both motivation and opportunity.”43 They cite verses like Q.33:26-27, which 
state: 
He brought those People of the Book who supported them down from their strongholds and put 
panic into their hearts. Some of them you [believers] killed and some you took captive. He passed 
on to you their land, their houses, their possessions, and a land where you had not set foot: God 
has power over everything. 
 
These early Muslim scholars emphasize that the Muslim fighters were not motivated by 
greed or fear, but rather inspired by their piety, devotion to God, and desire to spread 
Islam throughout the world.  
 The opposing view emphasizes the “Arab” nature of the conquests. Since in the 
history of the Arabian Peninsula, “scarcity and poverty held sway,” Arab tribes felt 
compelled to move into the fertile lands of Mesopotamia which had been controlled by 
the two great empires. They explain the Muslim armies’ successes as due not to the 
religious zeal of the fighters but instead to the Arabs’ natural fighting skills, honed 
through centuries of tribal warfare. This explanation was popular among many modern 
Orientalist scholars in the 19th and early 20th centuries, but as Bonner points out, “The 
Arabs suffered from scarcity and want, but so too have other peoples who have not then 
undertaken the conquest of the world.”44 
 The most persuasive explanation, rather, is that the conquests were undertaken 
primarily for political reasons, specifically the formation of the Muslim state. After 
asserting its strength in the defeat of the rebels in the ridda wars, the Medinan leadership 
of the Muslim community was looking for a way to further consolidate control over the 
                                                 
43 Bonner, 61. 
44 Ibid., 63. 
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fledgling state. As groups of Arab fighters were finding success in border skirmishes on 
the frontiers against the Byzantines and Sassanids, the central leadership in Medina acted 
in order to “maintain control and make sure of the loyalty of the Arab tribesmen.” As 
scholar F. M. Donner has noted, the unifying factor of Islam was a key tool in “providing 
the new state with a secure ideological foundation.”45 Richard Bonney agrees, saying that 
“since Arabia had been largely pacified, it was only by directing raiding and warfare 
outside Arabia that Medina’s hold over the Arab tribes could be preserved.”46  
As Bonner explains, this theory is actually a combination of the “Islamic” and 
“Arab” arguments for conquest – the Arab Muslims were motivated “at the same time by 
religious fervor and by hunger, want, and even…greed.”47 Indeed, the recorded narratives 
of these early conquests, known as the futuh, contain very different descriptions of units 
of fighters – some focus on the spoils of war and plunder, other put emphasis on the 
acquisition of “religious merit” and having “correct intention” (niyya) when undertaking 
jihad.48  
 
The early Islamic scholars and the debate over the doctrine of jihad 
 One of the curiosities of Islamic history is how dramatically the development of 
the actual theological doctrine of jihad lagged behind the actual performing of jihad. It is 
important to remember that “the practice [of jihad] preceded the theory,” and that “the 
jurists provided a post facto rationalization of the Arab conquests, a legal justification for 
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the rapid expansion of the Islamic empire that occurred in the decades following the 
Prophet’s death.”49  
 During the Umayyad period, the reach of Islam continued to expand as the 
Muslim community was transformed into what could be described as a “conquest 
society.”50 In fact, the scholar Khalid Yahya Blankinship has argued that the Umayyad 
caliphate survived only via perpetual territorial expansion, and in fact “it was the jihad 
that provided the ideological basis to the entire Umayyad enterprise…”51 In this way, 
jihad can be seen during the Umayyad period as an imperial ideology: historian Joseph 
Schacht proposed that the imperial legislation of the Umayyads eventually served as the 
basis for the development of much of Islamic law – including the Islamic law of war 
(siyar; also translated as the conduct of international relations). Only later did scholars 
attribute this law to “more acceptable Islamic sources” such as the Prophet and his 
companions.52  
According to Tamara Sonn, the Umayyads inherited rule over an empire based on 
an ideology that had no specific theory of governance and a chaotic system of 
interpreting law. The Umayyads adopted the characteristics of many pre-Islamic systems 
to fill in the gap, and established a system of judges, or qadis. These officials were 
political appointees charged with not only administrative responsibilities, but also the 
authority to exercise their own judgments about the application of Islamic principles. 
Over time, a group of scholars emerged who were regarded as having the most authority 
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to identify and interpret the sources of Islamic law.53 The four major schools of Sunni 
Islamic jurisprudence were each named after one of the early jurists. 
 Several significant splits occurred between the juridical schools in regards to the 
specifics of the performing of jihad. Malik Ibn Anas (d. 710), the founder and namesake 
of the Maliki school of jurisprudence, tended to be more cautious and moderate in his 
opinions on jihad, emphasizing that jihad was only legitimate when applied against those 
unbelievers who had “been identified politically as the enemies of Islam because of their 
aggression or hostility.”54  
However, for the “majority of classical Muslims scholars, particularly of the 
second century of Islam,” unbelief was “tantamount to injustice (zulm), aggression 
(‘udwan), and sedition (fitnah).” This view led them to the general assumption that all 
unbelievers must be the enemies of Muslims, without further investigation as to whether 
they were or not the actual perpetrators of injustice, aggression, and sedition. The 
underlying assumptions of the views of al-Shaybani, a preeminent jurist from the Hanafi 
school, were that “jihad was to be conducted perpetually until there was a complete 
elimination of religious fitnah, that is polytheism and unbelief.”55 
The religious justification for conquest and fervor of the Muslim forces produced 
a dramatic result – by the end of the Umayyad period, Muslim rule stretched all the way 
across North Africa to the Atlantic and into southern and central Spain (al-Andalus). To 
the east, Muslim armies had made significant inroads into central Asia and northern 
India. But it is telling that Islamic history does not favorably review the personal piety of 
the Umayyad rulers – most were regarded as “impious tyrants” whose Islamic credentials 
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were thin at best.56 The Umayyads were unpopular, regarded by their own people as inept 
and illegitimate, and are considered by Islamic historians to have been opportunistic, only 
citing Islamic law or principles when it suited their own purposes. 
During the Umayyad period, however, the definitions of what jihad meant were 
diverse, with various scholars arguing over its true import due to the “polyvalence of the 
Qur‘anic term jihad.”57 The “divergence of opinion” during this period about the nature 
of jihad centered mainly on the differing perspectives of the Hijazi and Syrian jurists. 
The jurists from the Hijaz, such as Ibn Jurayj (d. 762), placed greater emphasis on jihad 
as a struggle for personal piety, and did not consider it obligatory for all Muslims. 
Another, Sufyan al-Thawri (d. 778) argued that jihad was primarily defensive, and only 
defensive jihad could be considered obligatory on the individual Muslim. However, 
Syrian jurists such as al-Awza’i (d. 773) believed that even aggressive war was 
obligatory upon all Muslims. However, it is important to recognize that “the Syrian 
Umayyads during this time were engaged in border warfare with the Byzantines and there 
was a perceived need to justify these hostilities on a theological and legal basis,” while 
the more pacifist Hijazi jurists were far removed from the bloody frontier fighting.58 
It was under the Abbasid caliphate, which arose after the fall of the Umayyads in 
750, that the classical doctrine of armed jihad began to be formally articulated. 
Afsaruddin argues that “realpolitik” played a major role in the development of this 
doctrine, and that the military aspect of striving began to “receive greater emphasis.”59 
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Internal, spiritual aspects of jihad were downplayed and the Qur‘anic complexity of the 
term largely overlooked as jihad came to be synonymous with qital, or “fighting.”  
The Abbasid jurists used the doctrine of abrogation (naskh), mentioned earlier, to 
justify this interpretation, trumpeting the “sword verses” and rendering “null and void” 
the Qur‘anic injunctions which permitted truces with unbelievers and peaceful 
coexistence with Jews and Christians (ahl al-kitaab).60 Scholars such as Abu al-Khattab 
(d. 735) contended that verses such as Q.8:61 (“incline towards peace”) had been 
abrogated by the sword verses,61 and therefore jihad was to be “the underlying principle” 
governing relations between Muslims and non-Muslims.62 It is important to recognize 
that Abbasid exegetes like Abu al-Khattab were writing during a time at which the 
Islamic world was experiencing a persistent string of grave security threats, emanating 
from both internal revolts and from external powers.63  
 One of the most important developments in the theorization of jihad was the 
classical Islamic jurists’ division of the world into an Abode of Islam (dar al-islam) and 
an Abode of War (dar al-harb), first expressed by the famed jurist al-Shafi’i (d. 820). 
Although this doctrine has no basis in the Qur‘an or sunna, framing the world in this 
stark dichotomy was extremely helpful in legitimizing the conquests of the early caliphs. 
In this view of the world, the two sides are locked in perpetual conflict with one another. 
Since the dar al-harb is defined as any territory not under the rule of shari‘a, in the eyes 
of the Islamic jurists the states and rulers within the Abode of War “have no legitimacy, 
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and their rule is mere oppression or tyranny.”64 The early jurists concluded that it was 
permissible to conclude a truce with these rulers and states for up to ten years, based on 
the precedent of the Prophet in his signing of the Treaty of Hudaybiyya.65 The existence 
of peace between Muslim and non-Muslim states prompted some Shafi’i jurists to declare 
the existence of a third sphere, known as the dar al-sulh or dar al-‘ahd (the Abode of 
Truce/Treaty), pertaining to countries with which the Islamic ruler had concluded a truce. 
Such territories were off-limits to declarations of jihad, even though they were not part of 
dar al-islam. This view would eventually gain considerable prominence during the 
Ottoman era.66  
Nevertheless, the essentially dualistic nature of this scheme “requires warfare for 
the defense of lands under Islamic control and encourages the acquisition, through 
conquest, of new lands.”67 This does not mean that military jihad waged on the basis of 
this theory aims to convert non-Muslims to Islam by force, since this is explicitly 
forbidden in Qur‘an. Rather, Bonney and Bonner conclude that the construct of dar al-
harb and dar al-islam was created to legitimize the expansion of the political boundaries 
of Islamic rule under the pretext of defense of the religion. 
Indeed, as Afsaruddin observes, the Abbasid caliphate came to control a “vast and 
diverse political realm [and] had to develop a sophisticated law of nations” (al-siyar). 
From a political perspective, jihad to the Abbasid rulers was a tool that could be used to 
legitimize either offensive or defensive warfare for the sake of state security.68 The 
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Abbasid rulers readily accepted these “realpolitik” interpretations, which transformed 
jihad into a military and political tool. 
That is not to say that this period in history was without significant debates 
between scholars. Similarly, while some jurists of this period believed that under certain 
circumstances Muslims engaging in jihad could kill “protected” categories of people 
(women, children, the disabled, the elderly), important scholars like Ibn Rushd (d. 1198), 
for example, argued that most jurists were in agreement about the rules of war, including 
the non-killing of civilian women and children. Ibn Rushd identified the source of 
contention for this disagreement – the motive for killing the enemy: “Those who think 
that [they should be killed] because they are unbelievers do not make any exceptions for 
any polytheist. Others, who are of the opinion that this motive consists in their capacity 
for fighting, in view of the prohibition to slay female unbelievers, do make an exception 
for those who are unable to fight or who are not as a rule inclined to fight…” For Ibn 
Rushd, then, it was the enemy’s capacity to fight against the Muslims that mattered, not 
the fact that they were unbelievers.69 
Ibn Rushd also emphasized an important prerequisite for jihad – the prior 
invitation of the enemy to accept Islam before hostilities begin. However, other scholars 
such as Shamsuddin al-Sarakhsi (d. 1106) drew upon the example of a battle led by the 
Prophet Muhammad “to justify pre-emptive hostilities against the enemy without a 
declaration of war or prior invitation to Islam.”70 During the siege of Banu al-Mustaliq in 
628, the Prophet ordered a pre-emptive attack on the tribe (who were allied to the 
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Quraysh) after he heard that they had been planning a campaign against the Muslims.71 
Al-Sarakhsi also declared that the imam was allowed to agree to a treaty on terms which 
were favorable to the enemy, but also that he was permitted to renounce any such treaty 
unilaterally once the Muslims had regained strategic or tactical supremacy.72  
The jurist Al-Shafi’i was also credited with finding a “solution” to another 
important early debate about jihad – whether it was an “individual” obligation (fard ‘ala 
l’ayn) for each Muslim, or a “collective” duty for the community to undertake as a whole 
(fard ‘ala l-kifaya). Earlier jurists, such as Makhul during the Umayyad period, had 
argued in favor of fard ‘ala l’ayn, mainly because the Umayyad army during that time 
was in desperate need of more soldiers.73 Al-Shafi’i, however, decided in favor of fard 
‘ala l-kifaya, saying that the obligation to undertake jihad does not fall on every 
individual, but rather is fulfilled when a “sufficient number” of Muslim volunteers 
perform it. He did, however, make an exception, in cases of “military emergency” when 
“the enemy threatens the lands of Islam,” as circumstances when jihad did become an 
individual obligation.74 This interpretation became “widely (though not universally) 
accepted” and also served a very useful political purpose in that it “provided some 
resolution to tensions that had been breeding among various contending parties that 
included the imam/caliph…who needed to mobilize armies so as to defend and…expand 
the territory of Islam.”75  
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The Crusades also proved crucial to the development of the doctrine of jihad. 
Saladin, undoubtedly the most famous of all Muslim military commanders, credited with 
defeating the European crusaders, used the language of jihad to rally support for defense 
of the lands of Islam, or what came to be known as a “counter-crusade.” His predecessor, 
the commander Nur al-Din, pursued a “puritanical drive towards ‘jihad of the sword,’” 
focusing his attention on Egypt, which was at that time controlled by the Fatimid dynasty. 
This was not because the Fatimids were Shi‘a (though anti-Shi‘a language, including a 
condemnation of “factionalism”, was in fact employed to rally support), but rather 
because Nur al-Din realized that the capture of Egypt would mean “an immediate and 
substantial accretion of military and financial resources for the war in Syria” against the 
Crusaders.76   
 Saladin himself made extensive use of jihad propaganda in order to drum up 
support for his military campaigns. Although this language was an attempt to “canalize 
energy and direct it outwards,” it amounted to little more than “coloured rhetoric in 
which everything is shown in extremes.”77 It did not provide “an immediate, practical and 
coherent policy” of jihad, and in the end proved unsuccessful – after his death in 1193, 
jihad propaganda and support for the counter-crusade “evaporated almost overnight.” 
Saladin’s Ayyubi successors immediately ceased using the language of jihad not because 
they disagreed with it on a theological level, but mainly due to the adverse impact it had 
had on a practical political level: Saladin’s “jihad of the sword” was hugely expensive, 
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had weakened the Muslims, and had provoked a military response against the Muslim 
state in the region.78 
 
Ibn Taymiyya and the jihad of rebellion 
Another source of early contention among the scholars was over the possibility of 
jihad to overthrow an unjust ruler. In this case, political motivations can usually be 
clearly identified – the early scholar Ibn Hazm (d. 1064), for example, was one of the 
leading proponents of using jihad to overthrow unjust Muslim leaders, calling for the 
change to occur as quickly as possible using whatever means necessary, whether political 
reform or armed struggle. However, he was also harshly critical of the leadership of the 
caliphate in Andalusia, for which he was routinely imprisoned.79 Not surprisingly, Ibn 
Hazm also argued that traditions and verses used to justify passive obedience to ruling 
authorities were not applicable because they had been abrogated by later traditions in the 
hadith that called for revolt and struggle (including jihad) against unjust leadership. In his 
view, obedience to unjust and corrupt leaders was contradictory to Qur‘anic texts that 
enjoined what was right and prohibited what was evil.  
However, most later scholars diverged from this interpretation, and warned 
against rebellion because of the likely “costs of such action.” It is not surprising that this 
later pro-stability interpretation also occurred once Islamic rule had been firmly solidified 
and institutionalized, for this ruling was in the clear interests of the political elites of the 
time.80 Nevertheless, the debates over this important aspect of jihad continued, and “it is 
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clear that with the passing of time, the differences between the jurists on the issue of 
jihad and its relations to questions of political power widened rather than diminished.”81  
No scholar, jurist, or thinker in Islamic history has had a greater – or more 
controversial – impact on the development of the doctrine of jihad, and especially on the 
question of when (and against whom) jihad could be declared, than the medieval jurist 
Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328). The political context in which Ibn Taymiyya wrote is crucial to 
understanding his arguments about jihad. The Abbasid Empire, which had ruled the 
Islamic world for centuries, had disintegrated. The Mongols from the East had invaded, 
conquered, and dominated much of the Muslim world. Many of the Mongol rulers, 
however, had publicly converted to Islam. Yet Ibn Taymiyya was unconvinced – he 
accused the Mongols of being “fake” Muslims, and in his writings sought to make a clear 
distinction between those he considered “true believers” and those who were partial 
converts, lapsed believers, or apostates. The Mongol rulers were not true Muslims, Ibn 
Taymiyya argued, because their “conversion” to Islam had not been reinforced by the 
adoption of Islamic practices like the institution of shari‘a as the law of the land.82  
Utilizing the language of jihad, Ibn Taymiyya proclaimed that it was an Islamic 
duty to “fight the Mongols who came to Syria.”83 Yet Ibn Taymiyya went even further – 
it was not only the unjust, impious Mongol rulers that were to be fought, but also any 
Muslims who accepted the Mongol rulers, or even neglected to fight against them. In 
1303, Ibn Taymiyya issued a fatwa against the Muslims of Mardin who had surrendered 
to the Mongols in 1260, because they “showed apathy about the [non-Islamic] law 
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imposed by the Mongols and their refusal to undertake jihad against the Mongol 
occupation.”84  
This fatwa was in fact one of the first precedents for the doctrine of takfir, or 
declaring self-described Muslims to be apostates and legitimate targets of violence. Ibn 
Taymiyya explained in the above fatwa that “Any community or group that refuses to 
abide by any clear and universally accepted Islamic law…must be fought until they abide 
by its laws. This applies eve though they make the verbal declaration [shahada, or 
expression of Islamic faith] and abide by some of its laws.”85 While Ibn Taymiyya was 
reluctant to employ the term takfir in his fatwas against allegedly “false” Muslims, he 
considered it appropriate to determine a Muslim’s “Muslimness.”86  
To support his argument, Ibn Taymiyya cited the example of the caliph Abu Bakr 
in fighting the rebellious tribes who refused to pay the zakat to the central government in 
Medina, as well as a hadith report in which Muhammad declared that anyone who helps 
or supports “oppressive” and “wicked” rulers “will not come to me on the Day of 
Judgment.” Ibn Taymiyya also addresses the important question of leadership in jihad – 
for if it is the duty of all Muslims to fight against and unjust or impious ruler, then the 
classical prescription which insisted that jihad be declared only by a caliph or Imam 
cannot be followed. Ibn Taymiyya circumvents this restriction by declaring, “We should 
join jihad against them with any ruler, commander, or group that is closer to Islam than 
they, if such is the only means of fighting them.”87 This allowance for the 
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decentralization of the leadership of jihad was a key development in the evolution of the 
doctrine. 
Ibn Taymiyya was a prolific writer, and in his later treatises he further expanded 
his views on jihad. In his treatise on Public Policy in Islamic Jurisprudence, Ibn 
Taymiyya wrote that “he who forsakes the Law of Islam should be fought, though he may 
have once pronounced….Faith [in Islam].”88 In his famous chapter on “The Religious and 
Moral Doctrine of Jihad” in Governance According To…, Ibn Taymiyya wrote that jihad 
was “the best voluntary [religious] act that man can perform,” – even greater than 
performing the hajj – and  saying that performing it “implies love and devotion for 
Allah.”89 Those who participate in jihad have only two outcomes: “either victory and 
triumph or martyrdom and Paradise.” Ibn Taymiyya added that death while performing 
jihad is superior to all other forms of dying: “the death of a martyr is easier than any 
other form of death. In fact, it is the best of all manners of dying.” Again, he emphasized 
that “if a rebellious group, although belonging to Islam, refuses to comply with clear and 
universally accepted commands, all Muslims agree that jihad must be waged against 
them, in order that the religion will be God’s entirely.”90 He repeated his conclusion 
again later, “those who depart from the law of Islam must be fought, even if they 
pronounce the...professions of faith.”91  
Ibn Taymiyya also argued that jihad was obligatory whether the jihad was 
offensive or defensive: 
The most serious type of obligatory jihad is the one against the unbelievers and against those who 
refuse to abide by certain prescriptions of the shari‘a, like those who refuse to pay zakat, the 
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Kharijites and the like. This jihad is obligatory if it is carried out on our initiative and also if it is 
waged as defence.92  
 
However, Ibn Taymiyya goes on to clarify that only defensive jihad can be considered an 
individual obligation on every Muslim (fard al-ayn) – offensive jihad is by contrast a 
collective duty (fard al-kifaya), meaning that if it is fulfilled by a sufficient number of 
Muslims, the rest of the Muslims umma need not participate, and merit will be given to 
those who took the initiative to fight. Ibn Taymiyya explains that only defensive jihad is 
performed out of necessity – the offensive type of jihad “is voluntary fighting in order to 
propagate the religion, to make it triumph and to intimidate the enemy…”93 
Richard Bonney writes that “no other Muslim writer, medieval or contemporary, 
has exercised as much influence on the modern radical Islamist movement as Ibn 
Taymiyah.”94 Many aspects of Ibn Taymiyya’s ideology would come to characterize 
modern militant Sunni movements, such as rejection of Sufism – especially “innovations” 
such as the worship of saints and pilgrimages to shrines – and hatred for the Shi‘a, who 
Ibn Taymiyya described as “more dangerous than the Jews and the Christians and…more 
to be feared since they acted treacherously within the [Muslim] community.”95  
Although Muslim critics of Ibn Taymiyya point to the fact that he was imprisoned 
four separate times, by a judge from each of the four major schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence, as a reason to dismiss him as an extremist not worthy of the title of Shaykh 
al-Islam, “for militant anti-establishment Islamists his several arrests and death in prison 
only serve to confirm his radical credentials.”96  
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Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and the Sa‘udi jihad 
Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was an 18th century scholar and Islamic 
reformer from the central Arabian region of Nejd. He came from a prestigious family of 
jurists and scholars of the Sunni Hanbali school of jurisprudence, and was himself a 
serious student of Islamic theology. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab believed that a return to strict 
adherence to tawhid, or “absolute monotheism,” was the only way to restore the glory of 
Islam and create a just, stable, and powerful Islamic society.97 The shahada, or vocal 
expression of Islamic faith, proclaims that “there is no god but God, and Muhammad is 
the messenger of God.” Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab saw a need for a “return” to the essence of 
that monotheism, which he saw as having eroded under the centuries of Ottoman rule, 
and believed that adherence to tawhid should be stringently reflected in public and social 
life. 
 In fact, the ideology espoused by Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was heavily 
influenced by the writings and teachings of Ibn Taymiyya.98 Drawing inspiration from 
Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab sought to “find a pure Islam, untainted by the 
developments of later centuries.”99 Like Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was also 
firmly against the adoption of any rituals or beliefs of any other religions into Islamic 
practice, many of which he believed had been absorbed into Islam by the 18th century. He 
also opposed taqlid, or following the accumulated interpretations of Islamic law over the 
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centuries by legal specialists, which he felt had become more important to the ulema than 
the actual direct study of the Islamic scriptures themselves.100   
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab further believed that practices such as praying for the 
intercession of saints or prophets was an expression of “polytheism,” because it violated 
tawhid by taking the focus away from God. In each area where Wahhabism spread, there 
are countless stories of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab personally ordering the graves of all Muslim 
saints dug up and their remains scattered, so as to prevent the people from engaging in 
activities that would compromise tawhid.101 He even believed that visiting the Prophet’s 
tomb was heretical, as well as celebration of the Prophet’s birthday (mawlid an-nabi). 
Additionally, he felt that mosques should be free of decoration and none could bear an 
inscription of the Prophet’s name.102  
 The puritanical ideology preached by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was relegated to a 
small minority of followers until he allied with the tribal leader Muhammad Ibn Sa‘ud in 
the late 18th century. This combination of politico-military and ideological power gave 
new life to Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s movement. 
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab promised Ibn Sa‘ud that he and his descendents would “rule 
over the lands of Nejd and its regions” if he dedicated himself to the promotion of tawhid 
among his subjects. Apparently tantalized by this promise of conquest and power, Ibn 
Sa‘ud and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab swore a mutual oath of loyalty in 1744.103 According to 
the pact, “you [Ibn Sa‘ud] will perform jihad against unbelievers. In return you will 
be…leader of the Muslim community and I [Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab] will be leader in 
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religious matters.”104 This combination of military-political power and religious-
ideological authority made the Wahhabi-Sa‘udi alliance especially potent, since the amir 
(political leader) could conduct military operations, but only the Imam (religious leader) 
could legitimize such operations in a religious context and declare them part of rightful 
jihad.105  
Later that year, the alliance declared jihad against all polytheists (interpreted as 
those who did not accept Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s formulation of tawhid). Thus began the 
first joint Wahhabi-Sa‘udi military conquest of the Arabian Peninsula. In this and 
subsequent cases, the assault would begin on the ideological front, with Ibn ‘Abd al-
Wahhab sending a letter to the leader of a town or region calling on him to accept his 
teachings, especially the principle of tawhid. Many leaders, realizing that Ibn ‘Abd al-
Wahhab was backed by the power of Ibn Sa‘ud, responded positively and accepted the 
doctrine, peacefully surrendering to Wahhabi-Sa‘udi authority. If the leader did not 
accept the Wahhabi doctrine, Ibn Sa‘ud would commence his military operations against 
the leader and his tribe.106 This action was legitimized by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s 
adaptation of Ibn Taymiyya’s takfir ideology – although Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab recognized 
that only those people who had been previously instructed in the Qur‘an and hadith but 
had then rejected the faith could be called an apostate and an unbeliever, his views on 
shirk (polytheism) meant that he considered most Muslims, aside from his own followers, 
guilty of such “associationism.”107 Thus, those tribes who refused to accept his 
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interpretation of tawhid could not be considered true Muslims, and it was therefore 
permissible for Ibn Sa‘ud’s forces to fight against them.  
Although initially successful in conquering much of the Arabian Peninsula, the 
Wahhabi-Sa‘udis were eventually defeated by Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha, the powerful 
Ottoman governor of Egypt. Muhammad ‘Ali was persuaded by Istanbul to lead his 
forces into Arabia to expel the Wahhabi-Sa‘udis from the Hijaz in 1811. Muhammad 
‘Ali’s superior and modernized forces were more than a match for the Bedouin raiders, 
and the Egyptian governor retook Mecca and Medina in 1812. However, a remnant of 
Wahhabi-Sau’dis remained in the Nejd, and began their resurgence in 1865, when they 
established their capital in Riyadh. After being again defeated and exiled to Kuwait, the 
Wahhabis returned under the leadership of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Sa‘ud 
in 1901, initiating their re-conquest of the peninsula.  
At this time, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Sa‘ud made an important strategic decision in his 
bid to control Arabia. In 1912, the Ikhwan, or “Brotherhood” were organized as a 
Wahhabi paramilitary militia. The Ikhwan were a Bedouin tribe that settled in the town of 
al-Artawiyyah in 1912 with the permission of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Sa‘ud, who then adopted 
and organized their movement under the Sa‘udi banner by sending Wahhabi missionaries 
to them.108 The purpose of sending these mutawwi’in to the desert tribes was “to kindle 
them in a zeal for jihad” using Wahhabi ideology.109 According to Schwartz, the Ikhwan 
were originally envisioned by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Saud as a way to control the Bedouin 
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tribes and keep them under Saudi-Wahhabi control, as well as utilize them as an effective 
fighting force for his conquest of the Arabian Peninsula.110  
The effect of this acceptance of Wahhabi ideology was to transform the Ikhwan’s 
traditional raids against other tribes for material gain into jihad against the “unbelievers” 
for the sake of Islam.111 It also meant that the Bedouin warriors were now ready to 
sacrifice themselves for the sake of Wahhabi Islam, and these fighters became 
“consumed by their desire for martyrdom.” Inspired by religious rhetoric, the Ikhwan 
were known for brazenly charging enemy lines despite usually being heavily 
outnumbered. The Ikhwan also abandoned the traditional rules of warfare developed by 
the Bedouin over the centuries. Poore observes that “their honor was now found in 
killing, and they maximized bloodshed to the point of excess in the name of religion.”112 
Despite their legendary brutality, their enthusiasm for battle clearly also had a profound 
impact in assisting ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Sa‘ud’s expansion and conquests – indeed, with the 
help of the Ikhwan, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Sa‘ud extended the borders of his kingdom into the 
Eastern Province and the Hijaz.113 Between 1916 and 1928, a full twenty-six Bedouin 
uprisings against Wahhabi-Saudi authority were brutally suppressed by the Ikhwan.114 
With the conquest of Mecca and Medina in 1924 and the ousting of the ruling 
Hashemite dynasty, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Sa‘ud’s control of the Arabian peninsula was 
nearly complete. However, the jihadi enthusiasm of the Ikhwan would soon outlive its 
political usefulness to ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Sa‘ud. Until this point, the Wahhabis had only 
invoked jihad against other rival Muslims who stood in their way during the conquest of 
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the Arabian peninsula. When following the conclusion of World War I the Ikhwan 
demanded that ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Sa‘ud continue the jihad against the British in Iraq, 
Transjordan, and Kuwait, he refused, realizing that British interests and power in those 
regions were too strong to be challenged. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Sa‘ud then joined with the 
ulema against the Ikwhan and defeated them soundly at the battle of Sibillah in 1930. 
Having served their purpose in the Sa‘udi conquest of the peninsula, the Ikhwan were 
crushed, as ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Sa‘ud imprisoned the rebellious Ikhwan leaders and firmly 
restored his control. Karpat concludes that the Sa‘udis “relied on Wahhabism [only] 
when convenient” and were quick to control and suppress it when it posed any challenge 
to their political authority.115  
 
The Ottomans and jihad 
Under the domination of the Ottomans, the practice of jihad in the Muslim world 
took on a decidedly different role – rather than directing jihad against external enemies 
such as the Byzantines, the early Ottomans invoked jihad mainly against other rival 
Muslims.  
 The Ottomans undertook countless raids and campaigns into Europe, but these 
actions were known by the Turkish variation, ghaza, or “raiding.” In the view of Ottoman 
historian Cemal Kafadar, ghaza meant “raiding,” not “divinely-commanded war” (jihad); 
it was not constrained by the legal norms of jihad and often served as a tool for expansion 
and the acquisition of treasure, as well as glory in battle for the ghazi warriors. This may 
be partially because these Ottoman ghazi warriors often allied with Christians and 
incorporated other “infidels” into their ranks, so the ideology of these ghazis is 
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disputed.116 Yet in a speech to the council that decided to launch the conquest of 
Byzantine Constantinople, sultan Mehmed II argued that  
The ghaza is our basic duty, as it was in the case of our fathers. Constantinople, situated as it is in 
the middle of our dominions, protects the enemies of our state and incites them against us. The 
conquest of this city is, therefore, essential to the future and safety of the Ottoman state.117  
 
Although the sultan referred to the ghaza as a “basic duty,” he followed it by using rather 
conventional political arguments for a campaign against Constantinople (its geostrategic 
location and the fact that it was giving aid and protection to the enemies of the Ottoman 
state). Yet after the conquest was complete, Mehmed II proclaimed that “he was the only 
Muslim ruler who could ‘fit out the people waging the holy wars of ghaza and jihad.’”118 
 One of the most prominent examples of early Ottoman ghaza came during the 
conflict between the Ottoman sultan Selim and the Mamluk rulers of Egypt in the early 
16th century. Once Selim had defeated the Mamluks, the caliph in Cairo transferred all 
rights to the caliphate to Selim and his heirs, linking the caliphate and the Ottoman 
dynasty. In addition, the wars between the Sunni Ottomans and the Shi‘i Safavid Empire 
were often viewed as an ideological conflict between Sunnism and Shi‘ism, and the 
Ottoman leadership regarded each new campaign against the Safavids as the beginning of 
a new ghaza.119  
 The later Ottomans, however, increasingly used religious exhortations and 
proclamations of jihad to justify military conflicts. When the Russians annexed the 
Crimea in 1783, the Ottoman sultan Abdulhamid I declared that it would be retaken with 
a ghaza. Likewise, Napoleon Bonaparte’s seizure of Egypt in 1797 was met with a 
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declaration of jihad against “infidel savages” who had captured Muslim land. Sultan 
Selim III claimed that the French invasion of Egypt endangered the holy cities of Mecca 
and Medina and would result in “territorial fragmentation and the extirpation of Muslims 
from the face of the earth.” Selim III further claimed that other religious groups were also 
at risk because the French “doctrine of liberty was hostile to religion.”120 
 These proclamations of jihad can be understood in the context of the considerable 
weakening of Ottoman authority and control over their disparate territories and regions 
during the 18th century. As the corrupt, bureaucratic Ottoman administration became 
increasingly unpopular with its subjects, the great colonial powers of Europe had begun 
carving up the Ottomans’ dominions. The Ottoman rulers’ increased usage of jihadi 
rhetoric to rally support against these invasions and incursions was undoubtedly a 
reflection of their internal and external political weakness. 
 This pattern would continue throughout the 19th century. During the Greek 
revolution of 1821, believing that he was the victim of a Christian conspiracy backed by 
Russia, Sultan Mehmud II sought a declaration of jihad from the chief Mufti against the 
Greek Christians. After consulting the Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Constantinople (who 
opposed the rebellion), the Mufti refused to declare a jihad – and as a result was replaced 
and then executed by Mehmud II, along with the Patriarch and other Greek Orthodox 
leaders.121  
Yet the Ottomans continued to respond to European invasions with declarations 
of jihad. The fourth Russo-Turkish war launched in 1877 by Russian Tsar Alexander II 
“for Orthodoxy and Slavdom” sought to “neutralize, if not liquidate, the Ottoman state 
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and the caliphate as a political and cultural-religious force.” With the full backing of the 
chief mufti, sultan Abdulhamid II proclaimed a defensive jihad against the Russians. The 
war was a disaster for the Ottoman state – 300,000 Muslims were killed and a million 
subjects were displaced from the Balkans and Caucasus, and the Ottomans lost control 
over Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, and Bulgaria. In the Berlin Conference of 1878, the 
Ottomans lost two fifths of their territory and one fifth of their population.122 When 
Greece absorbed Crete in 1897, Abdulhamid II “reluctantly” declared jihad against 
Greece and won a quick victory in less than a month. 
When the British invaded Egypt in 1882, Egyptian journals, publications, and 
mosques proclaimed jihad in defense of Muslim lands. The leader of the short-lived 
Egyptian resistance, Ahmad ‘Urabi, was described in such publications as “the leader of 
the mujahidun” who “has sold himself and his army to the jihad in the path of God…”123  
Faced with the serious decline of Ottoman power and the danger of complete 
collapse of the empire, Abdulhamid II decided to assert his role as caliph and “threatened 
to launch an international jihad against imperialism if Muslim interests were seriously 
damaged by the great powers,” which were now clearly intent on carving up what was 
left of the empire. Abdulhamid II also began to emphasize his title as caliph (amir al-
muslimin) rather than sultan in order to “place the stress on Muslim unity.”124 He saw this 
as an advantage: 
As long as the unity of Islam continues, England, France, Russia, and Holland are in my hands, 
because with a word [I] the caliph could unleash the jihad among their Muslim subjects, and this 
would be a tragedy for the Christians…one day [Muslims] will rise up and shake off the infidel’s 
yoke. Eighty-five million Muslims under [British] rule, 30 million in the colonies of the Dutch, 10 
million in Russia…altogether 250 million Muslims are beseeching God for delivery from foreign 
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rule. They have pinned their hopes on the caliph, the deputy of the Prophet Muhammad. We 
cannot [therefore] remain submissive in dealing with the great powers.125  
 
However, Abdulhamid II realized that “a miscalculated jihad could backfire; it was the 
properly manipulated threat of jihad alone which might produce suitable results” for the 
Ottomans.126 The sultan was convinced that the European powers were taking over his 
territory and encouraging the “liberation” of other parts of the empire as part of a new 
“crusade.” Bonney notes that “in using this term, [Abdulhamid II] was echoing the 
terminology of writers who made the comparison of contemporary colonialism to the 
earlier Crusading era.” The use of this rhetorical device would increase dramatically 
during the rise of the radical Islamist movement in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries. The pan-Islamic press eagerly jumped on Abdulhamid II’s use of such 
language, and the first Muslim history of the Crusades, published in 1899, noted that “our 
most glorious sultan, Abdulhamid II, has rightly remarked that Europe is now carrying 
out a crusade against us in the form of a political campaign.”127 This is a tactic that would 
be repeated by the militant Islamists of the later 20th century, including Osama bin Laden. 
 During World War I, the call to jihad was issued by the Ottomans in five separate 
fatwas calling for the “Muslims of Turkish stock in Kazan, Central Asia, Crimea, India, 
Afghanistan and Africa to rise against their Russian and European masters.” One 
particular fatwa issued 11 November 1914, read: 
Question: Now that it has been established that Russia, England, France, and the governments that 
support them and are allied to them, are hostile to the Islamic Caliphate, since their warships and 
armies attack the Seat of the Islamic Caliphate and the Imperial Dominions and strive (God forbid) 
for extinguishing and annihilating the exalted light of Islam, is it, in this case, also incumbent upon 
all Muslims that are being ruled by these governments to proclaim jihad against them and to 
actually attack them? 
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Answer: Yes128  
 
Karpat notes that there is considerable evidence, including letters between German and 
Ottoman officials, that the German government actually encouraged the Ottomans’ 
declaration of jihad against France and Britain – in fact, the potential to use pan-Islamism 
and especially jihad as a weapon to weaken their European adversaries was an especially 
promising prospect for the Germans in their efforts to persuade the Ottomans to ally with 
the Central Powers. German Baron Max Von Oppenheim had spent considerable time in 
the Middle East and “believed that if Turkey participated in war against England, it could 
incite other Muslims to rebel and tie down much of the British army and navy.”129 
However, these calls to jihad produce virtually no Muslim response, perhaps 
because, as Karpat argues, the Muslim subjects in question “had no compelling interest in 
fighting for one European power against the other,”130 as the Ottomans were allied with 
Germany and Austria-Hungary. Or, as Bonney points out, by this point the Ottoman 
caliphate’s call to jihad was nearly completely discredited, since it “smacked of 
opportunism.”131 During the late 19th century, the Ottoman sultans were sensing the 
impending collapse of their empire, weakened by corruption, economic domination, and 
European colonial encroachment. Sultan Abduhamid II, for example, feared that allowing 
the independence of the Balkan states would lead to a domino effect of secession by other 
Arab regions, and even the loss of Anatolia. He therefore sought to strengthen the ties 
between the state and Islam in order to bolster his own credibility and preserve the unity 
of the empire. He saw this as a way to “prevent the Arabs from breaking away, and [he] 
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invoked the threat of [jihad] to prevent further interference in Ottoman domestic affairs” 
by the European powers on the pretext of protecting the “rights” of Christian 
minorities.132 
When Mustafa Kemal “Ataturk” proclaimed the Turkish Republic and abolition 
of the caliphate in 1922, so ended “over four and a half centuries of Ottoman history…in 
which state-controlled jihad was present at the outset and subsequently had never been 
very far from the centre of political affairs.”133 Yet it is also telling that no Ottoman 
sultan ever performed the pilgrimage to Mecca during the six centuries that the dynasty 
existed.134  
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PART II: Political Islam and Jihad in the 20th and 21st Century 
Political Islam and the modern jihad 
Beginning at the end of the 19th century, a trend developed among Islamic jurists 
which attempted to define jihad as exclusively defensive warfare. These jurists cited 
classical examples like that of al-Shafi’i and emphasized the Qur‘anic verses, such as 
Q.8:61 that called for reconciliation and peace: “But if they incline to make peace, then 
incline to it also, and trust in God.” They also attempted to put the traditionally 
“offensive” verses about jihad (such as the “sword verses”) into context and downplayed 
the doctrine of naskh.135 These jurists were fully aware that the historical example of 
military campaigns by Islamic rulers, as well as “the classical legal literature as a 
whole[,] recognized offensive as well as defensive warfare.”136 However, their purpose in 
attempting to shift the definition of jihad this was to ensure the place of shari‘a in 
modern Islamic societies, which were at that time almost universally under the 
domination of European colonial powers. By emphasizing jihad as a primarily defensive 
doctrine and downplaying its ability to be used to justify offensive warfare, these jurists 
were attempting to make jihad – and shari‘a in general – appear more palatable and less 
threatening to their European rulers. 
This emphasis would soon change, however. Chafing under the weight of colonial 
domination by the European powers, many Arab intellectuals, writers, and scholars began 
supporting ideologies that promised liberation from colonial rule and a return to a golden 
age of prosperity and power. Many of these intellectuals would lend their support to the 
secular Arab nationalist movement, but not all.  
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Political Islam, or Islamism, arose as an alternative reformist ideology. Supporters 
of political Islam claimed that any government that based its authority on a source other 
than Islam was illegitimate, and the proliferation of such governments was responsible 
for the decline of the Muslim world. Islam, they argued, precluded the idea of modern 
nation-states due to the fact that Muslims are members of a worldwide umma, or global 
community of believers. Islam was not meant to be simply a religion or a system of 
belief, but a way of life and perfect model for social and political organization – one that 
if implemented in its true form could fix all the ills that plagued the Muslim world, 
including poverty, corruption, and weakness that allowed for domination by the Western 
powers. Hence the quintessential, all-encompassing Islamist motto: “Islam is the 
solution.” 
 
Hasan al-Banna and the jihad of the Muslim Brotherhood 
In 1928, Egyptian scholar and activist Hasan al-Banna (d. 1949) founded an 
organization that would become one of the most popular and enduring Islamic political 
movements of the modern era: al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin – the Muslim Brotherhood. The 
Muslim Brotherhood was founded just after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the 
Caliphate, meaning that no authentic Islamic political authority existed for the first time 
in over 1300 years. Al-Banna rejected the system of nation-states that had sprung up 
throughout the Muslim world following World War I which were based on Western-style 
institutions and political structures. He strongly believed that only a government which 
based its legitimacy and policies exclusively on the Qur‘an and the shari‘a could be 
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successful in revitalizing the Islamic world. Al-Banna was responsible for pioneering the 
idea of Islam as a nizal al-kamil wa shamil – “a complete and perfect system.”137 
In his famous letter to King Farouk of Egypt, entitled “Towards the Light,” al-
Banna’s case for Islamic government was laid out most clearly. He described Egypt as 
poised at a crossroads, with two paths available – either the way of Islam and Islamic 
principles, or the way of the West and its organization and methods of governance. 
Arguing in favor of the former, al-Banna lauded the many benefits of Islamic 
governance, citing the historical example of great Islamic civilizations as well as the 
unifying effect that a government based on Islam could have on the Islamic world, which 
would give it a “great moral advantage.” He also promised that an Islamic system would 
“be able to solve the many complicated problems which the present institutions have 
failed to solve.” Indeed, al-Banna argued that “there is no regime in this world which can 
supply the forthcoming nation with what it requires in the way of institutions, principles, 
objectives, and judgments to the same extent as Islam can.” Al-Banna also noted the 
strengthening effect that Islam could have on the armed forces of the nation by “igniting 
in them the spirit of Islamic jihad.” Rather than fighting for a regime or secular nation, 
soldiers in al-Banna’s vision would instead be fighting for Islam.138  
Hasan al-Banna believed that armed jihad against corrupt rulers and regimes was 
a legitimate method of achieving the ideal Islamic state, enshrining it as a modus 
operandi even in the Muslim Brotherhood’s motto: “Allah is our objective. The Prophet 
is our Leader. The Qur‘an is our Constitution. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of 
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Allah is our highest hope.”139 Yet al-Banna did not believe that immediate jihad to 
overthrow the government was desirable – instead, he favored a gradualist approach in 
which the Brotherhood would seek to reform and educate society at the grassroots level 
in true Islamic teachings and values as a necessary precondition for the ultimate political 
empowerment of Islam. This ultimate triumph could occur either through a peaceful 
transition or through violent jihad – but only after the citizenry had been properly 
Islamized.  
Political developments, however, would lead to dissent from this gradualist 
approach. Fearing the Brotherhood’s increasing popularity and rumors that it was 
planning to overthrow the government, Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmoud al-Nukrashi 
Pasha ordered the Brotherhood disbanded in December 1948. In response, the Prime 
Minister was assassinated by a member of the Brotherhood, and in turn Hasan al-Banna 
himself was assassinated in February 1949, most likely by a member of the Egyptian 
intelligence service. Outlawed in Egypt and with thousands of its members rounded up 
and imprisoned by the authorities, the Brotherhood went underground.  
 
Mawdudi and Qutb: jihad as worldwide revolution 
Another figure important to the rise of militant Islamism in the 20th century was 
the Indian ideologue Sayyid Abu’l ‘Ala Mawdudi (d. 1979). Mawdudi’s influence on 
modern Islamist movements is considerable – his supporters have praise him as “the Ibn 
                                                 
139 Fradkin, 14. 
Mayer 48 
Taymiyyah of his era.”140 In a famous speech he delivered in 1939, Mawdudi laid out a 
clear and concise summary of Islamist ideology concerning jihad: 
[T]he objective of Islamic jihad is to eliminate the rule of a non-Islamic system and establish in its 
stead an Islamic system of state rule. Islam does not intend to confine this revolution to a single 
State or a few countries; the aim of Islam is to bring about a universal revolution. Although in the 
initial stages it is incumbent upon members of the party of Islam to carry out a revolution in the 
state system of the countries to which they belong, but their ultimate objective is no other than to 
effect a world revolution.141  
 
Mawdudi’s book Al-Jihad fi’l Islam (Jihad in Islam), published in 1930, was extremely 
influential in the Muslim community. Mawdudi was troubled by the Ahmadi movement, 
which opposed the idea of armed jihad “on the grounds that it was incompatible with the 
spirit of Islam as a religion of peace and that it sought to propagate the Islamic faith 
through violence. Mawdudi believed it was important to offer a traditional defense of 
jihad, “lest the Ahmadi view…began to gain ground with Muslims.”142 Mawdudi argued 
that the era of jahiliyya prior to Islam was characterized by extreme violence. Jihad, 
Mawdudi argued, was instead based on a respect for life, because it protected people 
from each other. He emphasized that Islam explicitly forbade conversion by force – this 
was not the purpose of jihad. Instead, jihad was necessary to “liberate [people] from 
injustice and violence.” Under an “unjust” political system, Mawdudi believed that it was 
impossible for Muslims to accomplish their primary objective on the earth – “enjoining 
right and forbidding wrong.”143 To this end, Mawdudi argued that 
Islam has prescribed that by systematic endeavour, jihad – and if the necessity should befall, by 
war and bloodshed – all such governments should be wiped out. In their place a just and equitable 
system of government should be erected which is founded upon the fear of God and based upon 
the canons He ordained.144 
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The ideas of Mawdudi were not confined to the Indian peninsula, but rather spread 
throughout the Muslim world, influencing many Islamist thinkers during the mid-
twentieth century and beyond. One of these was the Egyptian writer and ideologue 
Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966). According to Adnan Musallam, Mawdudi’s writings had a 
significant impact on Qutb’s political radicalization.145 
A popular writer and activist, Qutb succeeded al-Banna as the ideological leader 
of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb, however, departed radically from the ideas of al-
Banna in several important ways. Unlike al-Banna, who pointed to the Muslim ummah as 
the ideal example of unity and brotherhood among believers, Qutb argued that a true 
Muslim community only existed in a society in which Islam took a “concrete form.” 
Therefore, Qutb argued that “the Muslim community has been extinct for a few 
centuries.” The ummah did not exist simply in lands “in which Islam resides” or “a 
people whose forefathers lived under the Islamic system at some earlier time,” but rather 
it only existed in “a group of people whose manners, ideas and concepts, rules and 
regulations, values and criteria, are all derived from the Islamic source.”146 In short, a 
“true” Islamic community only existed in a “pure” Islamic state based solely on the 
Qur‘an and the shari‘a.  
Also influential was Qutb’s theory that the world had entered a new era of 
jahiliyya, or “ignorance.” This term was a reference to the state of affairs that existed in 
pre-Islamic Arabia. “The whole world is steeped in jahiliyya,” wrote Qutb, and the 
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modern nation-states had committed “rebellion against God’s sovereignty on earth [by] 
transfer[ing] to man one of the greatest attributes of God, namely sovereignty, and 
mak[ing] some men lords over others.”147 This modern jahiliyya was different from the 
ancient form because it allowed for the creation of rules, laws, and societies “without 
regard to what God has prescribed.”148 Qutb believed the only way to lead mankind out 
of this neo-jahiliyya was to create a “vanguard” which “marches through the vast ocean 
of jahiliyya which has encompassed the entire world.”149 His book Ma‘alim fi al-Tariq 
(“Milestones”) was to serve as a guide for this “vanguard” of Islamic revolution.  
One of the most striking differences between Qutb and al-Banna was their 
diverging views on the timing and applicability of jihad. In his earlier years, Qutb did 
echo many sentiments similar to al-Banna’s emphasis on Islamic education and 
Islamization of a society as a prerequisite for the empowerment of Islam: “only 
after…every individual of the society…firmly believes that this system has been 
legislated by God Almighty.”150 He emphasized the practical emphasis of the 
Brotherhood’s mission: “Islamic government cannot be established before the people or 
the majority of them are aware and convinced by the form of Islamic life…”151 However, 
Qutb’s focus gradually shifted, and he eventually offered a far more immediate, violent, 
and revolutionary prescription for jihad.  
Qutb had been profoundly influenced by the dire socio-economic conditions in 
Egypt during the first half of the twentieth century. In some of Qutb’s early poems, 
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published in the 1930s, he laments the “age of tyranny” and “barbarity” in which he was 
living, in which the people were suffering with “no dignity and…no honor.”152 Much of 
Qutb’s poetry commented on the “injustice in his society…[and] also the behaviour of 
imperialism.”153 He bemoaned the British influence in Egyptian society and “support of 
the class of wealthy absentee landowners who dominated parliament [which] resulted in 
poverty…[which] was becoming increasingly desperate.”154 Qutb even mentioned jihad 
as the solution to these ills – “From the jihad I do flee not, I never was weak-hearted.”155  
In addition to these socio-political factors, another major development that had an 
impact on Qutb’s gradual shift to militancy was his witnessing of the brutal oppression of 
the Brotherhood by the government in Egypt during the 1950s. One militant poem written 
by Qutb in 1957, for example, was “coloured by the prison episodes of the time, when 21 
of the Muslim Brothers were shot dead in their cells.”156 In addition, “the bloodshed in 
prison shifted Qutb’s moral rectitude and his focus on social reform” to place a greater 
emphasis on political activism, and he shifted his “program of ideological and intellectual 
training” to “include a point of ‘retaliation’ in order to protect the Muslims from attack 
by the regime.”157 These prison experiences led to “further radicalization of [Qutb’s] 
thinking,” and the “government violence against the Islamist cause has been linked to 
Qutb’s changing views” about the revolutionary strategies and tactics to be used against 
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unjust regimes.158 The publication of his final and most famous work, Ma’alim fi al-Tariq 
(“Milestones”), written during his imprisonment from 1955-1964, was the culmination of 
this ideological evolution. However, this influence was not one-sided; Albert Bergesen 
notes that Qutb’s “ideas were both affected by, and contributed to, Egyptian political 
struggles.”159 The formation of Qutb’s ideas about revolutionary jihad was certainly 
affected by the political climate in Egypt during the 1950s and 60s, but it also in turn had 
a profound impact on Islamist political movements not only in Egypt, but throughout the 
Muslim world.  
Qutb believed that the movement of Islamic revival should not “confine itself to 
mere preaching to confront physical power, as it does not use compulsion for changing 
the ideas of people.”160 Therefore, Qutb advocated “the methods of preaching and 
persuasion for reforming ideas and beliefs; and physical power and jihad for abolishing 
the organizations and authorities of the jahili system which prevents people from 
reforming their ideas and beliefs but forces them to obey their erroneous ways and make 
them serve human lords instead of the Almighty Lord.”161  
Qutb blasted the “defeatist” and “apologetic” Islamic intellectuals and jurists who 
had proclaimed that jihad justified only defensive warfare, saying that they had “deprived 
[Islam] of its method, which is to abolish all injustice from the earth, to bring people to 
the worship of God alone…Islam does not force people to accept its belief, but it wants to 
provide a free environment in which they will have the choice of beliefs. What it wants is 
to abolish those oppressive political systems under which people are prevented from 
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expressing their freedom to choose whatever beliefs they want.”162 Qutb argued that the 
Qur‘anic verse which forbids compulsion in religion163 was “unrelated” to the objective 
of jihad which is to “annihilate all those political and material powers which stand 
between people and Islam, which…prevent them from accepting the sovereignty of 
God.”164  
The goal of Qutb’s call to jihad was that the “sovereignty of God” should be 
established “over the entire earth,” and that “[God’s divine] laws (shari‘ah) be enforced 
and that the final decision in all affairs be according to these laws.”165 The method for 
achieving this, in Qutb’s view, was jihad bil-sayf – “jihad of the sword” – which would 
“clear the way for striving through preaching.”166 In essence, Qutb’s formula was the 
reverse of al-Banna’s original strategy for the Brotherhood (preaching and education 
would clear the way for armed jihad against the government). Qutb maintained that Islam 
should not be confined by the restrictions of jihad defined narrowly as “defensive war,” 
but rather as the “defense of man against all those elements which limit his freedom” – 
for, as in the case of Abu Bakr and the rashidun caliphs, “how [else] could the message 
of Islam have spread when it faced such material obstacles as the political system of the 
state, the socio-economic system based on races and classes, and behind all these, the 
military power of the government?” Qutb concluded that the objective of freeing 
mankind “must employ jihad,” regardless of whether the homeland of Islam is 
“threatened by its neighbors.”167 Therefore, only the “final stages” of jihad found in the 
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Qur‘an – the verses of the sword and exhortations to offensive jihad – should be 
applicable; the earlier, less aggressive stages of jihad should be disregarded because they 
were abrogated by the later verses.168   
Qutb dismissed alternative explanations of jihad as a purely defensive or 
“internal” spiritual struggle as a result of “attacks on [Islam] by the shrewd 
orientalists.”169 Defending against the false accusations of the “Crusaders and Zionists” 
that Islam was a “religion of the sword,” some Islamic scholars defended Islam by 
“invoking the idea of [jihad as] ‘defense,’” but Qutb believed these explanations were 
misguided because they “lessen the value of jihad in Islam, narrow its scope, and 
apologize for each of its instances.”170   
Limiting jihad to “defensive” warfare in Qutb’s mind weakened Islamic 
civilization and society: “Those who say that Islamic jihad was merely for the defense of 
the ‘homeland of Islam’ diminish the greatness of the Islamic way of life.”171 Qutb 
rejected that offensive jihad was a “temporary phase” based on “temporary 
circumstances”, and instead exhorted Muslims to “eternal” jihad in order to “cleanse” the 
earth of “corruption” and “falsehood” – a struggle that will continue “until the Day of 
Resurrection.”172 Indeed, Qutb actually offered an alternative holistic reading, arguing 
that the reasons for prohibiting fighting during the Meccan period and restricting fighting 
during the early Medinan period were based solely on practical considerations – “it was a 
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question of strategy rather than principle.”173 To Qutb, offensive jihad was to be the norm 
– not the exception.  
In Qutb’s view, the conditions necessary for declaring jihad were broadly defined 
and easily met: 
The reasons for jihad…are these: to establish God’s authority in the earth; to arrange human 
affairs according to the true guidance provided by God; to abolish all the Satanic forces and 
Satanic systems of life; to end the lordship of one man over others since all men are creatures of 
God and no one has the authority to make them his servants or to make arbitrary laws for them. 
These reasons are sufficient for proclaiming jihad.174  
 
Qutb’s formulation of jihad was an aggressive, revolutionary ideology that would “free” 
humankind from “ubudiyyah [servitude] to…the usurpers of God’s authority.”175 Islam 
must “take the initiative” to free all human beings, and therefore Muslims had the 
obligation to declare jihad, which “cannot be restricted within any geographic or racial 
limits.”176 Likewise, Qutb reasoned that in some cases the “enemies of Islam” may “not 
take any action against Islam,” but such non-interference did not disqualify them as 
targets of jihad – “Islam cannot agree to this [situation of rububiyyat al-‘ibad lil-‘ibad, or 
lordship of some men over others] unless they submit to [Islamic] authority by paying 
jizya [the poll tax].”177  
Qutb faced a theological challenge in his advocacy of the right of Muslims to 
revolt against a despotic Islamic ruler. Traditional Sunni political theory did not readily 
accept this right of revolution, due to the trauma of civil war and sectarian strife that 
afflicted the early Islamic community during its early years. As a result, the general 
tendency of the ulama was essentially to conclude that even a despotic or unjust ruler was 
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better than anarchy and chaos. As a corollary to this argument, the traditional Islamic 
religious authorities generally held that legitimate jihad was only to be led by a caliph or 
an established religious authority within the community. As such, Qutb’s justification for 
revolution on “distinctly Islamic grounds” was a bold but difficult ideological 
proposition.178 Nevertheless, his intent was to “legitimize revolt in terms of mainstream 
Sunni thought.”179  
 
Jihad and terrorism: Islamist militant groups and the rise of al-Qaeda 
These aggressive formulations of armed jihad influenced a generation of Islamist 
activists and militant leaders throughout the Muslim world.180 One of the most prominent 
disciples of Qutb, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj (d. 1982) went on to become the head 
and main ideologue of the Tanzim al-Jihad organization (later Egyptian Islamic Jihad) 
which was responsible for the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in 
1981. Faraj’s pamphlet, The Neglected Duty, “built upon Qutb’s argument” about jahili 
society and jihad.181  
In The Neglected Duty, Faraj argued that jihad was “obligatory upon every 
Muslim” – a clear preference for jihad as fard al-ayn, or individual obligation. He 
challenged the notion that Muslims should not participate in armed jihad until they had 
completed the “first stage” of jihad – jihad against the nafs, or self. Citing scholars such 
as the 14th century Hanbali jurist Imam Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (a disciple of Ibn 
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Taymiyya) and using historical examples from the sirah of the Prophet, Faraj argued that 
jihad was divided into categories – not stages – and that when armed jihad was declared 
all Muslims were to participate, regardless of their level of piety.182  
Faraj dismissed the frequently-cited hadith report in which the Prophet 
Mohammad had reportedly declared jihad of the nafs to be the “major jihad” (with armed 
jihad being the “lesser jihad”) as a “fabrication.” This false hadith, according to Faraj, 
was introduced in order “to belittle the value of fighting by the sword so as to divert 
Muslims from fighting the disbelievers and hypocrites.”183 Furthermore, he argued that 
based on the hadith in which the Prophet proclaimed that “war is deceit” and an 
interpretation by the 13th century Shafi’i scholar Imam Abu Zakaria Mohiuddin Yahya 
Ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi, “it is permissible to deceive the kuffar (unbelievers) in war, unless 
that breaks a covenant or promise of protection.” Since Faraj argued that there was no 
“covenant between us and them [the rulers of the Muslims], because they are at war with 
the religion of Islam,” Muslims could “choose the suitable method of fighting which will 
enable them to deceive the enemy and achieve the victory.”184  
Faraj’s role in Sadat’s assassination resulted in his imprisonment and execution in 
1982. However, the assassination sparked a broader roundup of Muslim Brotherhood and 
Gama’at al-Islamiyya members in Egypt, including two of Faraj’s fellow militant Islamist 
ideologues: Sheikh Omar Abd al-Rahman (known as the “Blind Sheikh”) and a doctor by 
the name of Ayman al-Zawahiri, who would go on to lead Egyptian Islamic Jihad and 
later serve as Osama bin Laden’s deputy in al-Qaeda. 
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Montasser al-Zayyat, a former close associate of Zawahiri, has written that Sayyid 
Qutb was “one of the most important figures in terms of his impact on Zawahiri, [and] 
Qutb’s writing was important in shaping Zawahiri’s principles” – especially concerning 
jihad. Indeed, Zawahiri’s 2001 book Knights Under The Banner of The Prophet praises 
Qutb’s role in encouraging an Islamic revolution: 
Sayyid Qutb underscored the importance of monotheism in Islam, and that the battle between it 
and its enemies is at its core an ideological difference over the issue of the oneness of 
God…Although the Qutb group was oppressed and tortured by Nasser’s regime, the group’s 
influence on young Muslims was paramount. Qutb’s message was and still is to believe in the 
oneness of God and the supremacy of the divine path. This message fanned the fire of Islamic 
revolution against the enemies of Islam at home and abroad. The chapters of this revolution are 
renewing one day after another.185  
 
Qutb’s influence can be clearly seen in Zawahiri’s answer to an Egyptian interrogator 
while in prison: 
 Question: What is the meaning of “jihad” according to your cell? 
Answer: “Jihad” means removing the current government through resisting it and changing the 
current regime to establish an Islamic government instead. 
 Question: How would you replace the current government with an Islamic one? 
Answer: Through a military coup. We were convinced that civilians and the military should 
cooperate to achieve this end. 
Question: Why did you want to remove the current government? 
Answer: Because it does not rule according to the shari‘a of God, glorified be His name.186  
 
Zawahiri, like Qutb and Faraj, believed that preaching and education alone were not 
sufficient to bring about the ideal Islamic society. Without the authority of an Islamic 
government, they argued, there would be little hope of changing people’s beliefs and 
values. Zawahiri warned that “the establishment of a Muslim state in the heart of the 
Islamic world is not an easy goal or an objective that is close at hand.” However, “it 
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constitutes the hope of the Muslim nation to reinstate its fallen caliphate and regain its 
lost glory.”187  
 In Knights Under The Banner of The Prophet, published in December 2001, 
Zawahiri argued that in solving the problems of the Muslim world, “there is no solution 
without jihad.”188 Following the precedent set by others throughout history who have 
sought to legitimize jihad due to their perception that the Islamic umma is under siege 
from external foes, Zawahiri argued that jihad was an individual obligation, and that the 
Islamic movement must “hold every Muslim responsible for defending Islam, its 
sanctities, nation, and homeland.”189 Zawahiri’s call for obligatory individual jihad 
against the Americans and Jews emphasized the damage a single individual could inflict 
in waging jihad, taking the principle of fard al-ayn and extrapolating it to a chilling and 
extreme conclusion:  
Tracking down the Americans and the Jews is not impossible. Killing them with a single bullet, a 
stab, or a device made up of a popular mix of explosives or hitting them with an iron rod is not 
impossible. Burning down their property with Molotov cocktails is not difficult. With the available 
means, small groups could prove to be a frightening horror for the Americans and the Jews.190  
 
It is interesting to note that this theme of obligatory individual jihad is common among 
many contemporary militant Islamists. The “Blind Sheikh,” Omar ‘Abd al-Rahman, who 
is currently serving a life sentence in U.S. prison for his role in the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing, as well as a plot to bomb the United Nations headquarters and other 
New York City landmarks, held a similar view: 
The individual work and the jihad done by the individuals whether separately or in groups, is work 
Islam has approved and legitimized…if we said, ‘Let us wait until the establishment of an Islamic 
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army,’ then we have eliminated jihad, then jihad does not exist…if it is [only] an army which 
should do the jihad…then there will never be jihad.191  
 
Upon his release from prison in 1986, Zawahiri, like many Islamists at the time, traveled 
to Afghanistan to join the jihad against the Soviets. It was there that he met and joined 
forces with a wealthy Sau‘di engineer, Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden was a successful 
businessman who traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan to help the mujahidin who were 
resisting the Soviet occupation. He helped set up training camps and bases for these 
fighters in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and became one of the leaders 
of the “Arab Afghans,” or the Arab volunteers that had traveled to Afghanistan with the 
intent of waging jihad against the Soviet Union. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait 
in 1991, Bin Laden offered the Sa‘udi regime the assistance of his Arab Afghan forces to 
protect the country. Not only did the Sa‘udis reject his offer, but they invited more than 
500,000 American troops onto Sa‘udi soil to safeguard their security instead.192 Bin 
Laden regarded this decision as a horrific affront to not only himself and his movement, 
but also indicative of the regime’s lack of Islamic principles. In a 1995 letter of support to 
a group of dissenting Sa‘udi clerics (known as the sahwa), Bin Laden decried the  
[D]egree of degradation and corruption to which our Islamic umma has sunk, in its government 
and in the feebleness and cowardice of many of its scholars in the face of its enemies…this is 
because of their neglect of religion and weakness of faith, which allowed the enemy [foreign 
troops] to attack. The enemy invaded the land of our umma, violated her honor, shed her blood, 
and occupied her sanctuaries.193  
 
Zawahiri’s strategy was similar to that of many militant Islamists at the time – to focus 
first on defeating the “near enemy,” meaning toppling the Muslim regimes they saw as 
illegitimate puppets of the West. “The way to Jerusalem passes through Cairo,” Zawahiri 
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famously wrote in a 1995 article.194 In 1998, however, when he and Bin Laden 
announced the formation of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and 
Crusaders, his focus had shifted to the “far enemy” – the United States. Montasser al-
Zayyat reasoned that this was not due to an ideological shift in Zawahiri’s beliefs, but 
rather simply a practical response to the circumstances in Egypt at the time. Zawahiri’s 
group, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, had faced a series of setbacks in the early 1990s, including 
the foiling of several attacks on government officials, an uptick in the number of arrests 
of EIJ members, and a decline in the organization’s financial resources.195 In addition, 
while the conventional wisdom is that it was Zawahiri’s ideological influence on Bin 
Laden during the Afghan jihad in the 1980s which “converted” him to the jihadi cause,196 
Zayyat believes that Bin Laden had an impact on Zawahiri’s ideology as well, convincing 
Zawahiri that it was time to stop operations against the Egyptian regime and focus on 
their common enemy – the United States.197   
Bin Laden released a lengthy statement from his sanctuary in Afghanistan 
declaring jihad against the Americans for their continued “occupation” of the Kingdom 
of Sa‘udi Arabia. This document contained Bin Laden’s pseudo-juridical justifications 
for declaring jihad. In it, Bin Laden (not a religious scholar himself) drew extensively 
upon the findings of the sahwa in the letters of protest they sent to King Fahd during the 
1991 Gulf War. 
 Opening with a citation of various Qur‘anic verses, Bin Laden condemns the 
“Judeo-Christian alliance” that has conspired to kill and oppress Muslims worldwide, and 
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cites “the attacks and massacres committed against Muslims everywhere,” repeatedly 
drawing historical parallels between the current political situation and the Crusader 
invasions of the medieval period. According to Bin Laden, the most egregious of these 
conspiracies was the stationing of American troops on Sa‘udi soil, which Bin Laden calls 
“the greatest disaster to befall the Muslims since the death of the Prophet Muhammad.”198 
Bin Laden cites this perceived impotence along with the “suspension of Islamic law and 
replacement thereof with man-made laws” as reasons why the Sa’udi regime has 
“desecrated its legitimacy.”199 Therefore, Bin Laden calls on Muslims everywhere to 
“raise the banner of jihad up high against the Judeo-American alliance that has occupied 
the holy places of Islam.”200 He then cites various hadiths and Qur‘anic verses reminding 
Muslims of their eternal reward for fulfilling their obligation to participate in jihad during 
their time on earth. 
 Bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa announcing the formal creation of al-Qaeda201 and jihad 
against the United States contained similar themes. Due to criticism that Bin Laden 
himself lacked the necessary scholarly credentials to declare jihad, the fatwa was also 
signed by Ayman al-Zawahiri, as well as the leader of Egypt’s al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya, 
the secretary-general of the Jamaat-e-Ulema of Pakistan, and a leader of the opposition in 
Pakistan’s National Assembly in an attempt to bolster its credibility.202  
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 The fatwa proclaimed that the numerous “American crimes and sins” around the 
world were tantamount to a “clear proclamation of war against God, his Messenger, and 
the Muslims.”203 It also claimed that since “religious scholars throughout Islamic history” 
– and bin Laden specifically cites Ibn Taymiyya – “have agreed that jihad is an 
individual duty when an enemy attacks Muslim countries,”204 then it was an “individual 
duty incumbent upon every Muslim in all countries…to kill the Americans and their 
allies – civilian and military[.]”205 
 In a 1998 interview with al-Jazeera, bin Laden was asked why his call to jihad 
seemed to go against the tendency of other Islamic movements at the time which had 
started to shift towards involvement in the democratic process. Bin Laden answered by 
expounding on his justification for jihad, and explaining why he believed it was 
obligatory for all Muslims to fight the “Crusader-Jewish alliance”:  
We believe that jihad is now an individual duty incumbent on our umma, but we have to 
distinguish between the judgment itself and the ability to carry it out…but the question remains: 
who defines what the right conditions are? Should it be those who have relied on the world, or 
those who have taken no share in legal knowledge?...As for this widespread idea among Muslims 
today that now is not the time for jihad, then this idea…is wrong. Many scholars say that now is 
not the time for jihad, [but] unless they can justify this they are quite wrong. And if jihad is 
decreed to be an individual duty today, then we are obliged to strive with all our might to complete 
the preparation and the necessary conditions for it…the Sheikh of Islam ibn Taymiyya makes it 
clear in this regard that he who issues a juridical decree regarding jihad is he who has knowledge 
of the legal aspects of religion, who has knowledge of jihad and when it should be waged. In other 
words, he should wage jihad himself.206  
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Nevertheless, Bin Laden’s exhortations to jihad, especially his instruction to wage jihad 
against all Americans regardless of military versus civilian distinctions, differed 
substantially from those of past scholars. In a revealing October 2001 interview with al-
Jazeera reporter Taysir Alluni, Bin Laden was pressed as to how he can justify his 
attacks, which killed innocent women and children, in contradiction of the ruling of many 
renowned Islamic legal scholars. Bin Laden countered by citing scholars who support his 
position, including Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai, a senior Sunni Muslim cleric in Pakistan, 
who issued a fatwa against the U.S. after its invasion of Afghanistan.  
In response to the question of attacks that kill innocent civilians, which contradict 
the Prophet’s forbidding of killing women and children, Bin Laden answered that killing 
American civilians was simply “an eye for an eye” to revenge the innocent civilians and 
children that Bin Laden claims were killed by the “Crusaders” in Palestine and Iraq. This, 
according to Bin Laden, is “valid both religiously and logically.”207 When challenged by 
Alluni about the religious legitimacy of this argument, Bin Laden responded that “this 
forbidding of killing children and innocents is not set in stone, and there are other 
writings that uphold it.” He then cites the Qur‘an: “And if you punish (your enemy, O 
you believers in the Oneness of God), then punish them with the like of that with which 
you were afflicted….”208 However, in the pattern of those before him who have sought to 
justify their politicized declarations of jihad, Bin Laden cites the Qur‘an and sunna 
selectively – he neglects to mention that the verse concludes, “but it is best to stand fast.”  
He goes on to note that many “scholars and people of knowledge,” including Ibn 
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Taymiyya, taught that “if the disbelievers were to kill our children and women, then we 
should not feel ashamed to do the same to them.”209  
 
Conclusion: The U.S. Government’s Understanding of Jihad and the War of Ideas 
 Bin Laden’s invocation of jihad as a method to justify his war against the United 
States and the West is not a contemporary development. His selective quotation of sacred 
texts, Muhammad’s example, and Islamic jurists and scholars to support a militant 
position may be presented as a new innovation, but it is in fact just the most recent 
chapter in a story that began with the first generation of Muslims. In fact, the 
inconclusive nature of the references to jihad in the Qur‘an and sunna have left the term 
open to nearly 1400 years of chronic appropriation and manipulation by political actors to 
justify military conflicts, revolutionary worldviews, and political objectives.  
 There is, however, still plenty of relevance to the ongoing debate over the 
meaning and usage of jihad. One very important question is how the U.S. government 
has understood the meaning of jihad since September 11, and how it has incorporated 
that meaning into policymaking in the War on Terror. The 9/11 Commission report, 
ostensibly the U.S. government’s authoritative account of the history of al-Qaeda and the 
road to 9/11, mentioned the word jihad or its derivatives 126 times, but surprisingly 
offered no definition or explanation of the meaning of jihad beyond a generic (and 
inaccurate) reference to its translation as “holy war.”210   
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In a 2005 speech, President George W. Bush referred to “militant jihadism,” 
which he explained was an “evil ideology” that was “very different from the religion of 
Islam.” Terrorists, according to President Bush, “distort the idea of jihad into a call for 
terrorist murder against Christians and Hindus and Jews – and against Muslims…who do 
not share their radical vision.”211 President Bush did not explain what he believed jihad 
actually meant – he simply concluded that the “real” jihad must be different from al-
Qaeda’s conception of the term. 
In 2006, Dr. Douglas Streusand of the Marine Corps Staff College was 
interviewed by National Public Radio. He had written a memo recommending that the 
U.S. government completely remove the word jihad from its official lexicon when 
discussing the War on Terror. Doing so, Dr. Streusand argued, would have a twofold 
benefit – it would eschew the need for U.S. officials to attempt a difficult and complex 
explanation of the history of how the term jihad has evolved over time, and it would also 
deny terrorists religious legitimacy by even using the term in reference to their actions. 
“The term jihad generally means…striving in the path of God. And simply by its very 
definition, striving in the path of God is a good thing to do. If we are calling [terrorists] 
people who strive in the path of God, in other words if we are calling them meritorious 
Muslims, then we are implying that we are fighting Islam, even if we’re saying that we’re 
not.”212  
By January 2008, the Department of Homeland Security and the State Department 
had implemented Dr. Streusand’s recommendations, which had been echoed by many 
American Muslim advisors and groups consulted by the department. New guidelines 
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released by the DHS’s Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties announced that 
“terminology should…avoid helping the terrorists by inflating the religious bases and 
glamorous appeal of their ideology.” The memo suggested that “even if is accurate to 
reference the term [jihad]…it may not be strategic [to do so] because it glamorizes 
terrorism, imbues terrorists with religious authority they do not have, and damages 
relations with Muslims around the globe.”213  
A March 2008 memo from the Extremist Messaging Branch of the DHS’s 
National Counterterrorism Center recommended that government spokespersons should 
“never use the terms ‘jihadist’ or ‘mujahideen’ in conversation to describe 
terrorists…calling our enemies ‘jihadis’ and their movement a ‘global jihad’ 
unintentionally legitimizes their actions.” The memo also urges officials to “avoid using 
terms drawn from Islamic theology in a conversation” including the terms “salafi, 
Wahhabi, caliphate, Sufi, or ummah.”214 The State Department followed suit in April 
2008, with Condoleeza Rice reportedly forbidding the public use of the terms “jihad” or 
“jihadist” by any State Department official.215 216 Rather than understand and explain the 
origins, evolution, and usage of the term jihad to the American people, the U.S. 
government appears to have decided to simply stop using the term altogether. Polls have 
shown that Americans already admit to a broad ignorance about the basic tenets of Islam 
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– a Washington Post-ABC News poll in April 2009 found that 55 percent of Americans 
said that they lacked “a basic understanding of the teachings and beliefs of Islam.”217 The 
policy of removing discussion of jihad and other Islamic terms from public government 
statements will cause even more confusion and uncertainty in the American public as to 
the meanings of these terminologies when they are used by Islamist militants – or, even 
worse, left to believe that the militants’ usage of these terms is accurate and legitimate. 
This decision could be a devastating strategic mistake. The War on Terror, as 
counterterrorism officials such as former Undersecretary of State James Glassman have 
admitted, will be won not on the military battlefield, but rather on the ideological one.218 
The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism stated plainly that “In the long run, 
winning the War on Terror means winning the battle of ideas.”219 Drawing parallels to 
Cold War-era strategies aimed at discrediting communist ideology, officials like 
Undersecretary Glassman have recognized that the goal of this “war of ideas” is to 
“confront the ideology that justifies and enables the violence.” While the effectiveness of 
this effort will depend largely on efforts to enable credible Muslim voices to speak out 
against these ideologies, Glassman warns that “we ourselves [the U.S. government] 
should not shrink from confidently opposing poisonous ideas – even if they are rooted in 
a distorted and twisted interpretation of religious doctrine.” The United States should be 
actively engaging in ideological warfare with militant ideas promoted by groups like al-
Qaeda – not attempting to ignore or downplay their significance by removing words with 
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any religious connotation from our official discussion of terrorism and counterterrorism. 
Such a policy, however well-intentioned, will prove counterproductive in our efforts to 
win the war of ideas. 
The United States has an excellent opportunity to exploit a significant 
vulnerability in the ideology of militant Islamist groups. By understanding the historical, 
religious, and political significance of Islamic terms like jihad (as well as others 
mentioned throughout this paper), the U.S. government can show how these terms have 
been manipulated by political actors throughout history, undermining the militants’ 
claims that their ideas are based on religious authenticity. The Ottoman Empire’s calls for 
jihad against the Allied powers during World War I were largely ignored by Muslims 
because they were seen as transparently political and opportunistic. There is no reason 
why the same perception of illegitimacy cannot be fostered with regards to the calls to 
jihad made by modern militants like Osama Bin Laden.  
There are several ways in which the United States government can implement 
such a strategy. Counterterrorism expert Daniel Byman notes that the United States has 
been steadily losing the war of ideas in the context of the broader War on Terror. 
Winning the “hearts and minds” of Muslims around the world is a stated goal of the U.S. 
government, but to date American efforts on this front have produced very few results. 
One reason for this, according to Byman, is that “we do not integrate the war of ideas into 
our actual policy decisions.” The undersecretary of state for public diplomacy, who is 
ostensibly tasked with formulating the American information strategy, must compete 
with a “wide range of diplomatic concerns” and is forced to “spin policy decisions” after 
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they are made, rather than taking worldwide perceptions of policy choices into 
considering beforehand.220  
Byman also concludes that since efforts to “sell America” have been ineffective, 
the U.S. should instead be focusing on damaging the popularity of the militants in the 
eyes of the Muslim world. “Our goal is not to be loved,” Byman explains, but “to make 
the jihadists hated” – or at least more hated than the United States.221 The U.S. can 
achieve this goal by “focusing on violent excesses” committed by terrorist groups, 
especially highlighting the victims of terrorism, which are predominantly Muslim and 
often women and children.222 This tactic can have a significant impact on reducing 
popular support for these groups by exposing the way in which militants have 
appropriated jihad as a political tool to justify the slaughter of innocents. A concerted 
campaign to increase the negative perception of militant Islamist groups can weaken 
these groups – even if it does not immediately translate into more positive views of the 
United States in the Islamic world. It puts militants on the defensive ideologically, 
forcing them to “defend…their own violence and organizational pathologies” rather than 
“U.S. support for Israel” or other unpopular American foreign policy decisions.223 
Terrorism expert Walid Phares notes that “all it [would take] for Americans and 
other democracies to defeat their foes is to understand who that foe is and what it wants 
to do.”224 If the United States and its allies were to focus on directing their political and 
diplomatic energies at waging this ideological battle – instead of ignoring its existence 
                                                 
220 Daniel Byman, The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley 
& Sons, 2008), 181. 
221 Ibid., 190. 
222 Ibid., 185.  
223 Ibid., 187. 
224 Walid Phares, The War of Ideas: Jihad Against Democracy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 
175. 
Mayer 71 
and significance – it would “lead to an isolation and marginalization of the radicals.”225 
Without an effort to undermine the credibility of leaders like Osama bin Laden and 
challenge the legitimacy of militants’ calls for violent jihad against the U.S. and the 
West, the War on Terror will never be won. Military operations, diplomacy, and 
economic development will continue to be a part of the United States’ counterterrorism 
efforts, but without adequate comprehension of the ideological dimension of this conflict, 
victory will always be out of reach. Understanding the origins, evolution, and history of 
jihad – especially how it has been utilized for political purposes throughout Islamic 
history – is a vital prerequisite for the success of the United States government’s ongoing 
counterterrorism efforts.  
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